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Abstract
Agriculture is currently being liberalized. In industrialized countries, it consists in 
reducing agricultural support, while in developing countries, agricultural taxation has to 
be reduced. Simultaneously, the farmer’s status has significantly changed over the last 
two decades, both in industrialized and developing countries, with more and more 
farmers also having off-farm occupations. This dissertation describes these changes, and 
provides a quantitative assessment o f the distributive effects of agricultural reforms. 
Indeed, these reforms lead to dramatic consequences in terms of welfare distribution, 
between farmers and non-farmers, and among fanners themselves. This analysis 
complements already existing studies by taking into account the changing definition o f a 
farmer, leading to new results about the agricultural instruments most adapted to different 
economic, political and social objectives.
The methodology used is a calibrated mono-country general equilibrium model, 
applied to the European Union and to a very poor representative developing country, 
where the share o f agriculture in the economy is very large. The main results show that, 
in both kinds of countries, agricultural liberalization improves the global welfare o f the 
society, although some groups suffer from it. Indeed, in the European Union, farmers' s 
welfare decreases dramatically when agricultural support measures are eliminated. Some 
compensation schemes should hence be implemented, and direct payments appear to be 
the best instrument to target specific farmers. In developing countries, agricultural 
liberalization is likely to hurt the most vulnerable part of the society, urban poor and rural 
small producers. In this context, the elimination of the production tax should be preferred 
to that of marketing boards.
n
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Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a quantitative assessment of the distributive effects 
of agricultural reforms in some developed and developing countries. The agricultural sector is very 
important when looking at economic development, since the size o f this sector often reflects the stage 
o f development o f a country. In fact, in many developing countries, the agricultural sector still employs 
most of the active population and contributes to a large share o f GDP. In industrialized countries, on the 
contrary, this sector has shrunk dramatically, and it represents nowadays a marginal share o f  employment 
and GDP. Nevertheless, despite its tiny contribution to economic activity in industrialized countries, 
from a political and social point of view, this sector remains important. Therefore, all over the world, the 
agricultural sector either represents a large share of the economic activity (in less developed countries) 
or still has a significant influence on the social and political structure of the country (in industrialized 
countries). Agricultural policies are hence scrutinized everywhere: In developing countries, because 
they have a direct impact on a large share of the population; in industrialized countries, because they 
are often much more expensive than one might expect given the share o f the sector in the economy. In 
fact, in industrialized countries, the agricultural sector is subsidized, whereas it is traditionally taxed in 
developing countries.
All over the world, and whatever is the agricultural policy, the sector is currently being liberalized, 
under some domestic and international pressures. Such liberalization measures will undoubtedly lead to 
large economic and social changes. A large literature exists on the topic, the main goal o f  which is to 
assess the efficiency and welfare consequences o f agricultural liberalization. Indeed, the consequences 
in terms of welfare distribution, among farmers, and between fanners and non-farmers, are salient: 
Changes in agricultural policies are likely to lead to changes in the level of income available to economic 
agents, and also to changes in income distribution between agents.
The dissertation focuses on this welfare distribution issue. It complements already existing studies 
by taking into account a recent evolution of the agricultural sector, occurring both in industrialized
1
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and developing countries. This recent evolution consists in a dramatic change in the farmer’s status 
over the last two decades, since more and more farmers also have off-farm occupation. The traditional 
definition o f a farmer hence needs to be revised, and the target o f  agricultural policies needs to be 
clearly identified. The dissertation inserts this changing definition o f a farmer into a welfare distribution 
analysis o f liberalization measures, and assesses the optimal sequencing of liberalization measures 
according to different objectives.
To reach this objective, the methodology used is a calibrated mono-country general equilibrium 
model. It is first solved analytically, and it is afterwards calibrated for some representative industrialized 
and developing countries. The effects o f several agricultural policies are tested. The model is kept very 
simple, in order to assess easily the links between agricultural policies and reaction of the endogenous 
variables. The obvious limitation of such a simple model is its lack of realism on many issues, such as 
uncertainty and missing markets for instance. However, these issues may be of second order compared 
with distortions induced by agricultural taxes and price wedges. The results reached permit to draw 
conclusions on the best agricultural instruments to be used according to the definition of farmers chosen.
The dissertation is organized as follows: The first chapter presents the stylized facts o f the 
agricultural sector and policies in industrialized countries. The reciprocal link between the evolution of 
the agricultural sector and the agricultural policy reforms is shown. It is also shown how this evolution 
has an influence on income distribution in the agricultural sector and on the definition of a farmer. Given 
these stylized facts, a model is developed in chapter 2, and it is used to assess the income distribution 
consequences o f the Common Agricultural Policy reforms in the European Union. In chapter 3, this 
model is adapted in order to study a representative developing country in which the anti-agricultural 
bias is being removed.
2
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Chapter 1
The farm sector and agricultural policy in the OECD
1.1 Introduction
The agricultural sector has changed in the last two decades in all OECD countries. It has 
changed in many aspects, but the one we focus on regards income distribution issues. To this extent, the 
main changes in the agricultural sector can be characterized by an increase in the number of fanners 
having another activity (off-farm), by the catch-up o f non-farmers’ income by farmers’ one, thanks to 
these off-farm activities, and by the persistence o f income inequalities in the farm sector. At the same 
time as these changes took place, some agricultural policies reforms were implemented, towards more 
liberalization. These policy reforms were both a reason and an effect of the structural changes observed 
in the farm sector. Indeed, there is a direct link between agricultural policy and income distribution 
evolution: Agricultural policy used to act negatively on income distribution in the farm sector since 
support was very much linked to output. There is also an indirect link between agricultural policy and 
income distribution through the evolution o f the farm sector: Since the fanners’ income caught up 
the non-farmers’ one, the main goal o f the agricultural policy could no longer be to support fanners* 
income. Besides, with the development of off-farm work by farmers, the question of the changing 
definition of a farmer arises, and agricultural support has to be more targeted. These changes hence 
make necessary an evolution of the agricultural support instruments.
This chapter presents the interactions between the economic and social sides characterizing the 
farm sector in the OECD and it shows how these interactions can be used to explain the evolution of 
income distribution. It first presents the changes of die agricultural sector, focusing on the evolution 
of the share o f the sector in the total economy and on the evolution of agricultural policies. The 
European Union agricultural policy is studied in more detail, since it is the application country of one
3
o f the models presented in the thesis. Although agricultural sectors have experienced different kinds o f 
evolution in the OECD countries, their agricultural policy has often been quite similar to the European 
one. Therefore, the model applied to the European Union could be extended to other industrialized 
countries. The second part o f the chapter focuses on the evolution of income distribution induced by 
and leading to changes in the agricultural sector. By income distribution is meant distribution between 
farmers and non-farmers, as well as inside the farmers group. The confrontation of these two aspects 
o f  the evolution of the farm sector (agricultural policy, income distribution) allows us to look at the 
consequences o f agricultural liberalization with a new perspective in the other chapters o f the thesis.
1.2 Evolution of the agricultural sector and policy reforms
There is a twofold link between the evolution of the agricultural sector and agricultural policy 
reforms: Agricultural policy has an influence on the evolution o f the agricultural sector, which in turn 
leads to further agricultural policy reforms. This section first presents the economic evolution of the 
agricultural sector for several OECD countries. It then describes the agricultural policies implemented, 
with a special focus on the European Union Common Agricultural Policy.
1.2.1 Weight of the agricultural sector in some industrialized economies
In all OECD countries, the share of the agricultural sector in the whole economy has been 
shrinking over the last 4 decades. It now represents a small share of GDP and employment. However, 
the share o f the rural population is still very important, and there is an increasing interaction between 
the agricultural sector and the rural areas.
1.2.1.1 The agricultural sector in the European Union
The agricultural sector represents 3 % of GDP and 5 % of the labor force in the European 
Union in 2001. Agricultural land used represents 57 % of the EU surface. These global data hide
4
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some large differences between countries. For instance, in 1998, only 1.7 % of the active population 
o f the United Kingdom worked in the agricultural sector, compared to 18.2 % in Greece. Similarly, 
the agricultural sector represents only 1 % of German GDP, compared to 11 % in Greece. The EU 
agricultural exports and imports to and from the rest of the world represented respectively 7 and 7.7 % 
of total EU exports and imports in 1998 (27 % o f the exports in Greece, 22 and 23 % respectively for 
Denmark and the Netherlands). To this extent, the EU displays the same features as the rest of the world 
since agricultural products trade represented 7.6 % of world trade in 1998.
Although the agricultural sector represents a small share of the industrialized economies, it receives 
a large share of the public subsidies given to any productive sector. In 2000, the European agricultural 
policy accounted for 48 % of the European Union budget (73 % in 1985) and represented 0.49 % of EU 
GDP (2.5 % in 1988). This share of agricultural policy in GDP corresponds to the OECD average.
1.2.1.2 The agricultural sector in other industrialized countries
The agricultural sector accounts for 1.7 % of GDP in the United States and in Japan. This 
share is up to 5.6 % in New Zealand. The agricultural sector employs 2.6 % of the active population in 
the USA, 8.1 % in New Zealand and 9 % in Japan. Agricultural products represent 4 % o f US imports, 
5 % of the New-Zealand ones, and 12 % of the Japanese ones. Regarding exports, agricultural products 
represent 6 % of the total American exports (one third of the US agricultural production is exported), 
only 0.4 % of the Japanese exports, and a record of 45 % of the New-Zealand exports. In any country, 
the rural population represents much more than the people employed in the agricultural sector.
The following table summarizes the share of the agricultural sector in the main economic 
indicators in some industrialized countries:
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GDP Employment Imports Exports
European Union 3 5 7.7 7
USA 1.7 2.6 4 6
Japan 1.7 9 12 0.4
New Zealand 5.6 8.1 5 45
1.2.2 The agricultural policies
In industrialized countries, the agricultural sector has traditionally been supported by public 
policies. In the mid-80s, however, political and economic concern started to increase about the real 
justification o f these policies, and about their costs. At this point, the sector began to be liberalized, 
albeit to different degrees in the various countries. Liberalization has been very sharp in New Zealand, 
and almost non-existent in Japan. The European Union and the USA are somewhere in-between the two 
extremes. Liberalization measures have consisted, in all the countries, in reducing the level but also the 
kind of support provided to the agricultural sector. Before examining the liberalization measures, a brief 
description o f  the agricultural policy instruments is presented.
1.2.2.1 Some agricultural policy instruments
There are many alternatives criteria for classification o f these instruments. The one retained 
here considers the level of intervention in the production and distribution system. Using this approach, 
instruments are listed according to whether they are imposed directly at the farm level, or at some other 
point in the domestic market, or at the national frontier1.
At the farm level, we distinguish:
- deficiency payments, that are a variable production subsidy paid per unit of output to compensate 
for the shortfall (deficiency) between the average market price and a higher, pre-announced guaranteed 
price;
*It is the criteria also retained by Colman and Young (1989) w hen they present agricultural policies in developing countries 
(p.269).
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- input subsidies, which apply per unit o f variable input used (a cheap credit offered for the 
purchase o f the input would have the same effect);
- investment grants, w hich are subsidies for investments in medium and long run capital (such as
machinery, irrigation);
- production or acreage quotas, that impose limits on total production or acreage of a crop;
- compulsory food requisition, that force producers to sell minimum quantities o f their production 
to public trading organization, at below market prices;
- land retirement or set aside schemes, that offer payments to producers who accept to reduce the 
acreage planted with some crops.
At the domestic market level, we distinguish:
- public trading and marketing boards, that place a floor price in the wholesale market by 
purchasing commodities to fanners at a pre-announced ’’intervention price”. The marketing boards then 
manage the stocks o f agricultural products and organize the sales to consumers;
- food subsidies to consumers, almost non-existent in industrialized countries;
- public investment in agricultural infrastructure.
At the frontier level, we distinguish:
- import tariffs, levies or duties;
- export subsidies or taxes;
- import quotas;
- non-tariff barriers.
With agricultural liberalization policies implemented since the 1980s, the level and the diversity 
of the use of these instruments has changed.
7
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1.2.2.2 Evolution of the level of support
There are several indicators of agricultural support developed by OECD research teams. The 
main one is the PSE, which stands for Producer Subsidy Equivalent, or Producer Support Estimate. 
This is an indicator of the monetary value o f gross transfers to agricultural producers resulting from 
agricultural policies in a given year. Both transfers from consumers o f agricultural products (through 
domestic market prices) and transfers from taxpayers (through budgetary or tax expenditures) are 
included. Five categories of agricultural policy measures are included in the OECDs calculations of 
PSEs:
- measures that transfer money to producers by affecting producer and consumer prices 
simultaneously (market price support);
- measures that transfer money directly from taxpayers to producers without raising consumer 
prices (direct payments to producers);
- measures that transfer money to producers by lowering inputs costs;
- measures that reduce costs to the agricultural sector as a whole and are not received directly by 
producers (general services);
- other measures, the main elements o f which are funded by state or provincial governments, and 
certain tax concessions (other support).
1
The overall monetary value o f PSE depends on the size and structure of a country’s agricultural 
sector, as well as on the monetary unit used. Hence, it is useful to have a more neutral indicator, in 
order to compare support across countries, commodities and time. This indicator can be the support . 
expressed as a percentage of gross farm receipt (% PSE), which shows the amount of support to farmers, 
irrespective of the sectorial structure o f a given country. It can also be the support expressed as a 
percentage o f GDP (% TSE, or Total Support Estimate). The % PSE shows the impact of agricultural 
policy on producers’ income, while the % TSE shows the weight of agricultural policy on the whole 
economy.
$
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The evolution o f these two indicators is shown in the following graphs, that compare the level of 
protection now and 15 years ago in selected OECD countries:
Total support sstimats, % GOP
BJ Japan 06C0 NZ USA
h u h : OECD. MOI.p.13
In 2000, ’’for OECD as a whole, total support to agriculture, as measured by the TSE, amounted 
to 327 billion $, or 1.3 % of GDP, compared to an average of 2.2 % in the 1986-1988 period” (OECD, 
2001, p. 13).
idurcc: OECD. 2001. p 14
It can be noticed that, in the whole OECD group, the level of protection, whether measured as
a share of the farmers receipts (% PSE) or as a share of GDP (% TSE), has decreased in the last 15
years. This evolution shows the positive impact o f agricultural liberalization policies on the level of
market-orientation o f the sector. However, it can be noticed that, in the whole OECD group, agricultural
support still accounts for 1.3 % of GDP, and represents 35 % of the farmers’ gross receipts.
In the selected OECD countries, New Zealand is the one which has liberalized the most its
agricultural sector. Indeed, in New Zealand there was a protectionist policy until the early 1980s, when
9
»»»»»< IMi ü »W Mi» K l
subsidies to agriculture accounted for about 40 % of total budget deficit. Therefore, strong measures had 
to be taken. In 1984, market price support was eliminated, and ail forms of assistance were drastically 
reduced. As the assistance to agriculture sharply declined, farm production fell, profitability of farm 
business declined, farmers became increasingly indebted and net farm income as well as farmland 
prices sharply declined. The European Union and the USA have followed the same kind o f evolution 
regarding their level of agricultural support, mainly due to compliance with WTO agreements. In Japan, 
the agricultural sector is still very much protected, mainly for political reasons.
It has to be noticed that the Producer Support Estimate is reported here on relative terms. However, 
when assessed on absolute terms, the ranking of the countries changes. Indeed, an OECD study 
(2000) reports that, in the USA, the PSE per agricultural worker reached 21 000 USD in 1999, while 
it amounted to ’’only” 17 000 USD in the EU. Thus, contrary to commonly held beliefs, agricultural 
support per farmer is higher in the USA than in European Union.
As could be expected, the two main indicators o f  agricultural support (% TSE and % PSE) do not 
rank countries in exactly the same way. This is logically explained by the fact that the % TSE takes into 
account the weight of the agricultural sector in the overall economy, while the % PSE does not.
Other ways of measuring the level o f agricultural protection in the OECD countries exist. One 
o f them is the producer nominal protection coefficient (NPCp), which measures the ratio between the 
average price received by producers and the border price, both at farm gate level. The following graph 
shows the evolution of this indicator in the last 15 years in selected OECD countries:
10
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w n c  OECD. 2001. f. 17
For the whole OECD area, this indicator decreased from an average of 1.61 in the 1986-1988 
period to an average of 1.46 in 1998-2000. This indicates ”an improvement in market orientation with 
an increased share of farm receipts generated at world prices compared with that created by government 
intervention” (OECD, 2001, p.22). But it also shows that gross farm receipts are still 46 % higher than 
they would be if entirely generated at world prices. With a producer nominal protection coefficient o f 1, 
New Zealand can be seen as fully market oriented. With a nominal protection coefficient o f about 2.87, 
agriculture in Japan has a very low degree of market orientation, since the average price received by 
Japanese producers is about 3 times the world market price. In the European Union, the average price 
received by agricultural producers is 45 % higher than world price, while it is 19 % higher in the USA. 
However, this indicator only provides information on the level o f market support, and does not take into 
account any other support directly increasing the farmer’s income.
It should be noticed that, when assessing the level of support, domestic prices are often compared 
to a theoretical price level, which is assumed to emerge in a fully liberalized situation. And, obviously, 
there is no consensus on the level of this full liberalization price level. Indeed, many variables are 
affected by agricultural sector liberalization, such that it is hardly possible to reach a unique conclusion. 
This is therefore one o f the limits of the analysis of support levels, although it does not affect the 
international comparisons of support.
11
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Finally, the level of support per farmer or per hectare shows the difference in the structure of the
agricultural sectors in the countries studied.
Producer support estimate 
per hectare, in 1998-2000, in 
USD
Producer support estimate 
per farmer, in 1998-2000, in 
USD
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Mtircc: OECD. 2001. p i t
In Japan, the level of producer support estimate per hectare is much higher than in the other 
countries studied, while the level o f producer support estimate per farmer is only slightly higher. It 
reveals that the Japanese agriculture uses much less land than the other. On the other hand, the reverse 
observation for the USA shows that the American agriculture is less labor intensive than the European 
one, since its level of PSE per farmer is higher than it is in Europe, whereas the American % PSE is 
lower than the European one.
All these different indicators have shown the same kind o f evolution of the OECD agricultural 
sectors towards a stronger market orientation, even if  full liberalization is still far from being reached. 
However, in all OECD countries, not only did the level o f agricultural protection change, but so did the 
distribution of the share of each agricultural policy instrument.
1.2.2.3 Evolution of the instruments of support
With agricultural liberalization, the distribution of support between instruments has changed. 
In the European Union, market price support represented 84 % o f PSE in 1987, and shrunk to 52 % 
in 1997. Deficiency payments were almost non-existent before the CAP reforms in 1992, and already 
represented 17 % of PSE in 1997. The same range of evolution can be noticed for direct payments, with 
an even stronger increase, since they represented 31 % of PSE in 19972.
The same evolution can be noticed for the whole group o f OECD countries. Between 1987 and 
1996, the share of market price support in total PSE decreased from 65 % to 59 %. At the same time, 
the share of direct payments increased from 17 % to 23 % (source: OECD, 1998, p.59). This evolution 
makes agricultural support more visible, since it becomes increasingly funded through taxes and less 
so through price distortions: A direct tax replaces an indirect one. This replacement of market price 
support by direct payments is part of the liberalization policy, since direct payments are supposed to be 
only a transitory measure, and are assumed to be eliminated as well later on.
Japan is an exception in the OECD area, since its level and distribution o f support has changed 
little over the last two decades. Indeed, direct price support policy, reinforced by border protection 
measures, have been the main instruments of agricultural policy, representing, in 1993, 83 % of total 
agricultural support. ’T he low productivity associated with the small scale o f farming operations in 
Japan has required price support to be set at high levels in an attempt to achieve the policy objective 
of farm income parity with non-farm workers. [...] As a consequence o f these policies, Japanese 
consumers pay among the highest food prices in the world” (OECD, 1995, p.34). Moreover, Japan 
has not followed the same trend as most of the other OECD countries that used to provide relatively 
high support for agriculture: In Japan, the high proportion of market price support in total agricultural 
support has been fairly stable in recent years, while it has fallen in most other countries as a result of a 
shift to direct payments during the last decade.
2In 1991 in France, direct payments per farm amounted to 22 000 FF. In 2000, they represented 137 000 FF. In terms o f net 
revenue, they often now represent up to 2/3 of the net revenue o f  French farms (Roger, 2000).
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A broader typology of agricultural policy instruments would show the same kind o f evolution. 
Indeed, another way of distinguishing policy instruments regards their impact on price distortions and 
the market-orientation o f the sector. For instance, an OECD report (2001) distinguishes ’’payments 
based on historical entitlements, input constraints and farm income”, ’’payments based on inputs used” , 
’’payments based on area planted or animal number”, and ’’market price support and payments based o n  
output”. According to this classification, the evolution of the agricultural support in OECD countries is 
the following:
Composition of producer support estimate (%)
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We can notice a decrease in the share o f market price support and payments based on output in the
European Union, New Zealand, and the OECD area as a whole. However, the share o f this particularly
distorting instrument is constant in Japan, and even increases in the USA. In the European Union and
New Zealand, these payments based on output are mainly replaced by payments based on area planted
or number of animals (this instrument is used to orient the productions types), and, to a smaller extent,
by payments based on inputs used, which usually respond to environmental concerns.
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In the USA, the policy is different, since the evolution has mainly consisted in replacing headage 
payments by payments based on past entitlements, input constraint and on overall farm income. 
Payments based on past entitlements "are made without obligation to plant or produce any specific 
commodity, are not linked to current production and are therefore potentially less production and trade- 
distorting than other major forms of support to producers. Payments based on overall farming income 
act as income safety nets and are potentially much more equitable, and better targeted and tailored to 
farmers income needs than payments based on past entitlements” (OECD, 2001, p.21). Since the data 
available do not permit to distinguish between these two instruments, it is difficult to tell whether the 
American support has become more or less equitable than before.
The graph also shows that, in Japan, the composition of support has remained almost constant 
over the period, as previously noted using the other typology of support instruments.
We have seen that agricultural instruments have evolved towards a weaker link between production 
and support, since a large share of agricultural support has switched from price support towards direct 
payments. This evolution has some balanced consequences that are briefly presented now.
I<
1.2.2.4 Towards decoupled instruments ?
The ev olution o f agricultural support towards less production-based support (and, hence, 
towards more direct payments) is named ’’decoupling”, and is supposed to generate less distortions: 
Decoupled measures consist in supporting farmers in a way that does not, or at least as little as possible, 
distort production, consumption and trade. Decoupled measures have even been accepted in the WTO 
agreement as entering into the ’’green box”, which reveals their non-distortionary aspects3.
Truly decoupled instruments may be difficult to identify. For instance, it is often argued (cf, inter 
alia, Buckwell, 1997) that the main goal of direct payments, at least in the short run, is to replace price
3In the WTO negotiations, there is a classification o f  agricultural policy measures according to their degree o f  distortion 
creation and, hence, according to their need o f  dismantlement. The ’’green box" gathers instruments considered as fully 
decoupled, which have no or very little effect on productions and exchanges. The cost o f these instruments is only borne by 
tax-payers. The ’’green box”  instruments are exempted from internal support diminishing commitments. On the contrary, 
coupled instruments, as support prices, enter into the "red box", and their level has to diminish. Finally, the "blue box” gathers 
partly-decoupled instruments: They are still accepted provided they are linked to production reduction commitments.
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support. Therefore, in terms of overall trade distortions, these two instruments might have rather sim ilar 
effects, and the decoupled aspect of direct payments might be false. Moreover, according to Berthelot 
(2001), direct payments are distorting on a world level since only rich countries (with a well developed 
tax system) can afford them, while market price support is more easily implementable in any country.
Decoupled measures and the development of direct payments can also lead to a problem of 
support identification. Indeed, direct payments are included when measuring agricultural support. 
However, one of the goals of direct payments is to remunerate environmental and rural development 
services, which cannot be remunerated through the market because they mainly concern public goods 
for which no market exists. Therefore, this remuneration should not be included into the agricultural 
support calculations. A better way o f measuring agricultural support would be to measure final trade 
distortions, and to avoid any intermediate measure of support. Indeed, with the increase o f the use 
o f direct payments, it would become more difficult to distinguish between protection o f the domestic 
agricultural sector and remuneration o f environmental and social services through an intermediate 
measure o f support. To this extend, the development of decoupled instruments might lead to false 
conclusions regarding the evolution o f farm support.
It has been noticed that agricultural policies had evolved in roughly the same way in many OECD 
countries. In order to get a clearer view of this evolution, the next section presents the European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), its objectives, instruments, results, and the reforms that have been 
implemented in recent years. Many o f the statements made about the CAP could be applied, with m inor 
modifications, to other OECD countries.
1.2.3 Mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy
This section presents the European agricultural policy before the implementation of any 
liberalization measures. The objectives o f the policy are first reviewed, the instruments aiming at
16
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reaching these objectives are presented, and the results are finally assessed. It is shown how these results 
have led to the necessary implementation of reforms.
1.2.3.1 Objectives of the CAP
In the Treaty o f Rome, which laid the foundation of the European Union and came into force 
on l ai January 1958, the special position of agricultural policy was recognized in a separate article. 
Indeed, the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy was, from an administrative point 
o f view, an important step in the process of European unification. Article 39 o f the Treaty o f Rome 
describes the goals o f the CAP as:
- to increase agricultural productivity and to ensure a fair level of wealth for people working in 
this sector;
- to stabilize agricultural markets;
- to guarantee food supply security, which, in other words, means increasing agricultural 
production in order to reach self-sufficiency;
- to guarantee reasonable food prices to consumers.
To achieve these objectives (which can also be seen as constraints of the agricultural policy), 
several instruments are needed; they are presented now.
1.2.3.2 Main instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy
Although many instruments have been implemented, only the three main instruments are 
presented in details here: Market price support, deficiency payments and direct payments. They 
correspond to the largest share of support.
M arket price support
Market price support consists in artificially raising domestic agricultural prices, which become
higher than international market prices, for both consumers and producers. For instance, in the pre-
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reformed CAP, domestic prices o f agricultural products benefiting from market price support were, on 
average, 40 % higher than international prices. Market price support is achieved through administrated 
prices, exports subsidies and tariffs. Indeed, it becomes necessary to tax imports and to subsidize 
exports, otherwise competition with non-European producers would be unsustainable for European 
farmers. For some specific crops, price support policies are combined with production quotas and / 
or land set-aside in order to try to limit production. In the European Union, production quotas were 
particularly strong for milk. These complementary instruments appeared progressively in the CAP 
history, in order to deal with international constraints.
Market price support is usually used for products which are produced in large quantities and 
regionally dispersed. Although this kind o f support has declined since the 1980s in all OECD countries, 
it still remains the main agricultural instrument used. For instance, in the European Union, it represented 
84 % o f PSE in 1986-1988 and ’’only” 52 % in 1996-1998 (in absolute value the decrease is even larger 
considering the fact that the level of PSE has decreased as well, from 46 to 39 % of world price) (source: 
OECD, 1999). The reasons for the decrease in the use o f market price support are both productive 
and distributive: This instrument is more distorting than other kinds o f support, because it is less 
visible. Moreover, it is the least suitable instrument for targeting specific groups of farmers with income 
transfers. Indeed, the distribution of transfers through price support is very similar to that of output, 
hence it is not redistributive at all on the supply side. On the demand side, the main drawback of m arket 
price support is that lower income consumers pay a disproportionate share of transfers relative to their 
income, since they consume proportionally more agricultural products (they are usually inferior goods).
Deficiency payments
Deficiency payments are subsidies per unit of output, equal to the difference between a target price 
(usually the one fixed by market price support) and the market price. This instrument provides direct 
support to farmers’ income, without affecting the price paid by consumers, which is assumed to follow 
world market fluctuations. Deficiency payments are usually used for products whose production is
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limited and highly localized. Otherwise, administrative costs, and hence distributive leakages, may be 
too high, as deficiency payments require implementation and supervision at farm level.
On the supply side, they suffer the same distributive drawback as market price support, since the 
larger the production, the larger the deficiency payments received. On the demand side, their distribution 
effects depend on how progressive or regressive the taxation system is.
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Direct payments
Direct payments consist in direct income support and are conditional on the quantities o f factors 
owned and on their use, but are independent of current or future production. For instance, payments 
can favor extensive productions in poor areas. Land set-aside schemes is another example o f direct 
payments, since producers are offered payments to reduce the acreage allocated to a certain use. Direct 
payments can also be based on an invariable production volume (corresponding to the estimated output 
in the non-intervention situation, or to the past individual or regional average output, for instance), but 
farmers are not required to produce this level to receive the payment. For distributive reasons, direct 
payments often have a ceiling.
Direct payments are the most suitable instrument for transferring income to specific groups of 
farmers. Their use has increased significantly in the last decade, to represent 31 % of total Producer- 
Subsidy-Equivalent in OECD countries in 1997. In France, the average direct payments received by a 
farm have been multiplied by 5 between 1991 and 2000.
However, direct payments have quite high administrative costs, as they take place at farm level.
It is for this reason that they were initially limited to marginal or localized productions. On average, 
direct payments are more equally distributed than market price support and output, but the difference is 
still quite modest. This reflects the continuing strong link between most direct payments and output or 
factors of production.
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Less commonly used agricultural policy instruments
- input subsidies (on fuel or fertilizer, for instance);
- insurance or storage at a price lower than the market price;
- concessional credit, equivalent to interest subsidies;
- research and training;
- transport concessions.
All these instruments have been implemented over 30 years in the European Union (from the 
1960s to the 1990s). Their results are now examined, according to the main objectives they were given.
1 .2 3 3  Results of the CAP
To evaluate the results o f the CAP, the CAP situation has to be compared with the initial 
goals o f the policy. Success in three of the goals is easily monitored: Productivity, self-sufficiency, and 
evolution of fanner’s well-being.
The evolution of agricultural productivity
In the EU, over the period 1970-1987, the average growth rate o f total factor productivity (TFP) 
was higher in the agricultural sector than in the manufacturing sector, unlike in the USA and in Japan, 
as is shown in the table below:
TFP average growth rate between 1970 and 1987, in % per year:
autry æriaitue rraiiætiiing
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More«: B a w d  and Ja n «. 1996. P 131. uxt u h o r 'f  compatirions.
20
M
■ nil
These figures show the success o f the CAP regarding the modernization o f the European 
agricultural sector. The rise in the agricultural TFP was mainly due to an increase in labor productivity, 
reflected in the decrease in the number o f agricultural workers while agricultural output increased.
This evolution of productivity in the agricultural sector has logically led to a positive evolution of 
the self-sufficiency situation of the European Union.
The self-sufficiency objective
The European Common Agricultural Policy over-achieved its objectives regarding self-sufficiency4, 
and the EU generated surpluses in many agricultural commodities, which had to be stocked in order to 
maintain market prices. This surplus problem has been most serious for dairy products, cereals, beef, 
sugar and wine. Maintaining huge stocks was not possible in terms of either physical storage costs 
or interest charges on the value of the stock. For instance, stocks cost 3 700 millions ecus in 1991 
(equivalent to 6.1 % of EU budget)5. Hence, it has been necessary to find some means o f disposal. They 
have consisted in:
- Subsidizing the exports: This has been the cause of much concern in other exporting countries, 
since subsidized European exports have undercut other exporters on the world market;
- Increasing domestic utilization, by subsidizing the use of surplus products (mainly milk and 
wheat) as livestock food;
4Self-sufficiency ratios in the European Union for some representative products from 1968 to 1993 (a self-sufficiency ratio 
below 100 means that the country is not self-sufficient and has to import the product, and vice versa for a  self-sufficiency ratio
above 100):
1968 1993
cereals 86 126
sugar 82 135
beef 93 107
all agricultural products 22 76
The European Union became a net exporter for many agricultural products in the early eighties (source: Pointer, Keyzer et 
alii, 1995, p.40).
5However, this statement has to be put into perspective since, in the 1980s, stocks o f  many agricultural products in the 
United States were close to a year’s consumption (c f Lewis, Feenstra and Ware, 1989, p. 159).
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- Providing food aid to developing countries;
- The remainder was kept in stock in order to avoid dumping on international markets or because 
prices were expected to rise in the future. However, some stocks have also been discarded as they c o u ld  
not be kept for too long.
There is no doubt that the CAP reached its self-sufficiency objective. However, the objective o f  
improving the fanners’ well-being was not so successfully met. Indeed, while the CAP managed to 
increase globally fanners’ income, its policy has also led to some new distributive drawbacks.
Distributive drawbacks of the CAP
Regarding income distribution, the CAP faced the same problems as other agricultural policies 
in industrialized countries. First, in all OECD countries, agricultural support is unequally distributed 
among farmers, and is often concentrated on a small number of commodities, in certain regions apd o n  
large farms, thereby accentuating income disparities. Indeed, since the bulk of agricultural support in  
OECD countries is provided in the form of market price support, distribution o f support is not far from  
that o f output: The largest farms (which are usually also the most prosperous ones) are thus the m ain 
beneficiaries of support policies. Despite the existence o f  payments targeted to smaller farms, their share  
in total support is still too small to influence significantly the overall distribution. This leads to a positive 
relationship between farm income and support. In this sense, support is inequitable: In the European 
Union, the top 25 % of farms in terms of gross sales receive 68 % of total support and represent 72 %  o f  
output (OECD, 1999). These farms are generally characterized by both higher household incomes and 
higher net worth than those o f the average consumer and tax-payer who finance these transfers. To this 
extent, the CAP has not reached its objective of ensuring a fair level of wealth for the farmers.
Another distributive problem faced by the Common Agricultural Policy is that, like any other kind
o f support, agricultural support may suffer some leakage, if some income gains accrue to groups other
than the intended beneficiaries. An OECD study estimates that "only about 25 % o f the money spent on
producer support actually finds its way into the producer’s pocket” (OECD, 1999). Indeed, the support
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is either capitalized into asset values, particularly land, or is transferred up or down the food chain to 
inputs suppliers or processors and distributors. This problem is one of the reasons why payments not 
linked to production may be a more effective means o f providing support to farmers that really need it, 
although not costless when administrative and taxation costs are taken into account.
For these reasons, inter alia, some reforms of the European agricultural policy were implemented. 
They broadly resemble the agricultural policy reforms implemented in other OECD countries.
1.2.4 The CAP reforms
This section presents the reasons that led to the decisions of reforming the CAP; it explains 
the objectives o f the reforms, how they were implemented, and their results.
1.2.4.1 Reasons for the reforms
At the beginning o f the 1990s, reforming the CAP became unavoidable for three main reasons:
- A purely internal reason: As the European Union had become a net exporter o f agricultural 
products since the 1980s, exports subsidies accounted for much more than imports taxes. Hence, the 
CAP was less and less self-sufficient, its budget had become far too high, and drastic measures had to 
be taken to reverse the situation. The highest point was reached in 1985 when CAP accounted for 73 % 
of European budget.
- A purely external reason: Compliance with the Uruguay Round Agreement obligations 
compelled the European Union to liberalize its agricultural sector. Indeed, the Uruguay Round cycle of 
international trade negotiations was the first one to include the agricultural sector into the negotiations. 
One goal of these negotiations was to reduce trade barriers and subsidies on agricultural products, in 
order to reduce distortions on wx>rld agricultural markets. In fact, agricultural policies in developed 
countries have led to over-production and protectionism, which may have contributed to the world
price decline and instability observed during the last four decades for many agricultural products6. 
Concretely, agricultural liberalization measures aim to restore progressively the equality between b o rd e r  
and domestic prices, and producers* and consumers* prices. This integration o f the agricultural sector 
into the global liberalization trend ended up in 1994 by the signature o f the Marrakech Agreements. 
They compel industrialized countries to reduce the level of agricultural domestic support by 20 % fro m  
their 1986-1988 level, to reduce the value o f subsidized exports by 36 % from their 1986-1990 level, 
and to reduce the global level o f  protection (including non-tariff barriers, which have to be completely 
eliminated) by 36 % in 6 years (between 1994 and 2000). The European Union signed these agreem ents 
after several years o f negotiations, and therefore had to apply them.
- Finally, a reason that is both internal and external: The enlargement of European Union tow ards 
East European countries in the near future compelled the CAP to evolve. Since income levels are lo w er 
in these countries than in the EU, so are agricultural prices (in 1995, agricultural prices were 40 to 80 °/o 
lower in East European countries than in the EU). Hence, East European consumers would be unable to  
afford the high CAP support prices unless wages rose, which would in turn affect the competitiveness 
o f  the non-farm sector. Moreover, for East European farmers, the CAP prices would be a bonanza 
that could not be justified politically. Last, applying the pre-reformed CAP to East European countries 
would be financially unbearable since East European countries still have a much larger agricultural 
sector than the EU7.
1.2.4.2 Objectives and implementation of the reforms
Given the reasons just presented, and given the shape of the European agricultural policy, th e  
main objective of the CAP reforms adopted in 1992,1998 and 2000 was to lower the level of agricultural 
price support, so that domestic prices become closer to international ones. This was expected to reduce
6However, this evolution is also due to other factors: Price decline may be due to productivity gains in the agricultural 
sector, while price instability may be explained by specific features o f  the sector, such as low elasticity o f  demand and risk 
considerations due to the time gap between production decisions and sales for instance.
7The agricultural sectors in the Central and Eastern Europe countries that are in the first adhesion plan:
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surpluses and to freeze agricultural expenditures between 1999 and 2006, so that the agricultural budget 
stays at its 1999 level of 40.5 billion Euros (48 % of the European Union budget, down from 73 % 
in 1985). Moreover, changing from a price support scheme to payments to farmers shifts the funding 
burden from consumers to tax-payers, and may be fairer, both on the production and the consumption 
side: On the production side, it would lead to a fairer distribution o f support; on the consumption side, it 
would lead to a fairer distribution of the cost of agricultural policies.
In practice, the CAP reforms have led to two main changes in policy: A change in the instruments 
used, and a change in the funding of the agricultural policy.
Changes in the instruments used
The main aim of the CAP reforms has been to reduce the price support level (with a maximum of 30 
% for cereals, oilseeds and beef). A part of the losses of the producers is compensated for by deficiency 
payments. Another compensation scheme consists in direct aids to producers who have volunteered to 
practice a more extensive agriculture; these compensatory payments are linked to a fixed factor such as 
land. This new system is supposed to be less distortionary, since it is ’’decoupled” (: not, or less, linked 
to production). Moreover, the compensation measures (deficiency and direct payments) are supposed to 
be transitory. However, the question of their level and duration is not very clearly stated in the reform 
agenda. Regarding their level, they are ’’fixed with reference to (high) EU prices determined by past 
policies”. Therefore, they should not last forever, and ’’should be offered only on decreasing amounts
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source: Gower and Redmond 2000, adapted from p.90.
The adhesion o f  the first group o f  countries in the EU ’’will increase EU population by 16.7 % but add another 22.5 % to 
the EUs agricultural land and 31 % to the EUs arable land.” (Gower and Redmond 2000, p.91).
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and for a limited period o f time”(Henrichsmeyer and Witzke, 2000, p.96). Otherwise, compensatory 
payments would not solve many of the distributive problems linked to price support. They would o n ly  
allow to reduce the CAP expenditures, since the change in the instruments used leads to an evolution o f  
the funding of the CAP. This evolution is examined in the next section.
Changes in the funding of the CAP
The CAP reforms have led to changes in its funding, regarding its distribution between European 
and national levels, and between consumers and tax-payers.
The common financial responsibility has always been one of the principles of the CAP, m eaning 
that expenses incurred as a result of the CAP are financed at the European level. Following this rule, 
deficiency payments are fully financed by the EU as well. However, their implementation requires m o re  
administration at the individual farm level than the price support scheme. Hence it leads to a greater 
national influence on the system. This more decentralized system should be more efficient and fairer 
as it should deal more easily with heterogeneous situations, and be directed to specific target groups 
(lower income people). Moreover, although the common financial responsibility remains an important 
principle in the reformed CAP, each country may have to participate more in the policy funding since 
the CAP will become less self-funded via import levies. Indeed, since these levies will decrease w ith 
the decrease in the domestic support price, national participation may have to increase.
The changes in the funding of the CAP induced by the reforms has also an influence on the 
distribution of funding between consumers and tax-payers. Indeed, the reformed CAP is increasingly 
financed by government expenditures (direct transfers) instead of being funded by consumers (high fo o d  
prices). It makes the support for agriculture more ’’visible”, but it also makes its funding potentially 
fairer, since it becomes based on tax-payers’ income and no longer on agricultural consumption levels. 
Industrialized countries have sufficiently well developed tax systems to be able to raise money for a n ew  
purpose without entailing significant deadweight losses, and on an income basis (cf Munk, 1997).
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The first CAP reform decision was adopted in 1992, so its results can already be analyzed, in order 
to see whether it led to the expected consequences.
1.2.43 Results of the CAP reforms
The results of the CAP reforms are examined according to three criterions: The evolution 
of the farmers* income, of the production surpluses, and the respect o f the budgetary constraints. The 
choice of these three criterions responds to some implementation constraints. Indeed, if the farmers’ 
income suffers too much from the reforms, they would hardly be implementable, for political lobbies 
reasons. If the results of the reforms are not visible in the European Union budget, stronger measures 
would be adopted. Therefore, the results studied are some important ones, although many other 
criterions could have been presented.
The mean European agricultural income increased slightly after 1992 (with, however, all the 
inequalities a mean result can hide), whereas it had previously been stagnant, or, before 1988, even 
decreasing. It suggests that the recent compensatory payments have been more efficient than the 
previous market price support to reach the objective of farm income support. This evolution legitimates 
a partial compensate o f the farmers for the price support decrease. Indeed, the Agenda 2000 CAP 
reform has adopted a regressive payments scheme, with compensation ranking from 50 to 80 % of the 
previous level, according to the products. However, small farmers could be entirely compensated.
The surpluses o f agricultural products decreased after 1992: For cereals, the surplus declined from 
44 million tons in 1992 (equivalent to 0.075 % of the EU production) to 26 million tons in 1995 (0.05 % 
of the production). For beef, it shrunk from one million tons in 1993 (52 % of the EU production) to 82 
000 tons in 1995 (4.3 % of the production). It shows that an agricultural support less linked to production 
levels is very efficient to decrease surpluses, and, consequently, to reduce the cost of its management. 
Indeed, the CAP budgetary commitments were respected after 1992, as the share of the CAP in the 
EU budget decreased from 73 % in 1985 to 48 % in 2000. This evolution can be seen in the following 
graph, which represents the EU budget and agricultural expenditures as percentages of the EU GDP:
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The EU expenditures
tounx: Comm Six» Europiermi. 2000
On the three criterions chosen, the reforms were thus particularly successful. However, even 
with the CAP reforms, domestic European agricultural prices are still well above world levels and 
liberalization measures still have to go on in order to comply with international agreements. This m ay  
have some serious consequences for farmers.
We have discussed the global links between the agricultural policies and the evolution o f the 
agricultural sector in some OECD countries. The next part focuses on the particular link between 
agricultural policy and income distribution, inside the farm sector and between this sector and the re s t 
o f  the society. This link raises the issue of the changing definition of fanners.
13  Income distribution and the changing definition of a farmer
From a political economic point of view, if the farmers’ average income becomes equal 
or even larger than the average income of the whole population, there is no longer any justification 
for agricultural policy to try to increase farmers’ income. And, in fact, in all OECD countries, an 
increase in the farmers’ income has been observed so that it converges to that of the rest of the society. 
However, this rise in farmers’ income is mainly due to an increasing share of non-farm income in farm  
households’ income. This raises the issue o f the boundary betw een a fanner and a non-farmer. The
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comparison between the farmers’ and non-farmers’ incomes depends greatly on who is regarded as a 
farmer- In the European Union, one main feature is still that those who own the land are mainly those 
who work on it. Hence, land ownership seems to be a good means of distinction between farmers and 
non-farmers when comparing their well-being.
Moreover, agricultural development and policies in OECD countries are increasingly linked to 
rural development. Indeed, far fewer farmers are needed to cultivate the land, but many people live in 
rural areas. This new feature, added to the fact that more and more farmers have off-farm activities 
in their neighborhood, means that agricultural policy has an increasing impact on the non-farmer 
population. In other words, the farmer and non-farmer populations become more and more linked. For 
instance, about one third of the total OECD population lives in rural areas (which represent more than 
90 % of the national territory in OECD countries) and, in many countries, rural areas contribute more 
than half of total employment (OECD, 1998, p. 23). In the more specific case of France, it is notable 
that, in 1990, only 10 % of rural households were active agricultural households -and 11 % were retired 
agricultural households- (source: Mendras, 1995).
This can lead to a constant political weight of the agricultural sector, since the rise in the 
rural population might partially (or even more than partially) compensate for the reduction in farm 
population. However, farmers and rural non-farm population may have some conflicts of interest 
regarding agricultural policy; for instance, the rural non-farm population is usually more sensitive to 
environmental issues than the farm population.
This section first compares the well-being of fanners and non-farmers. It then analyzes the impact 
of changes in the agricultural sector on income distribution.
1.3.1 The farmers* well-being compared to the rest of the society
Farmers used to be poorer than the rest of the society, and this is still the case, on average, in
developing countries. However, in industrialized countries, this has become less and less true. In fact, a
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relationship seems to exist between the economic development of a country, the share of its ag ric u ltu ra l 
sector and the relative well-being of farmers compared to the rest of the society: The more developed 
the country, the smaller is its agricultural sector, and the richer are its farmers compared to the rest o f  
the society.
The main goals of agricultural policies in OECD countries were set up several decades ago, 
at a time when the agricultural sector was far more important than it is nowadays and farmers w ere 
significantly poorer than the rest of the society. Since these features are no longer true, the goals o f  
agricultural policies should evolve together with the society, or, in other words, they should take in to  
account the evolution of the ratio between the farmers’ and non-farmers’ well-being. When speaking 
about well-being, wealth and income have to be distinguished. Indeed, even if farmers’ households 
receive a smaller income than the rest of the society, they often own more assets than average.
The next two paragraphs hence consider fanners wealth and income.
0 .1 .1  The farm ers’ households wealth
Farmers have a particular status compared to the rest o f the society, since they often own th e  
business in which they work. Hence, even if their income is lower than average, their wealth (consisting  
in farm buildings, land, and other specific assets) might be higher than average. Gardner (2000, p. 1 0 6 2 ) 
reports that, in the United States, ’’very few farm households (in the neighborhood o f 1 %) are poor 
under the triple criterion o f low income, consumption and net worth”. Indeed, Hill (2000, p.310) 
remarks that farmers ’’are frequently holders o f wealth which is substantial and typically above that o f  
non-farmers. In the USA in 1986, the average farm equity of farm operator households whose incom es 
fell below the poverty line was substantially above the all-households average net worth. Among the 
farm households in poverty, more than half [...] had an average farm equity (net worth) over 3 times th e  
national all-households average”.
These examples focus on the USA, but they could be extended to most OECD countries, where 
the majority of farmers own the land they cultivate, as well as the farm buildings they use. Hence, even
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if farmers earn less than the average income, assessing their well-being is not so easy because o f the 
value of their wealth. And, before drawing any conclusion, it is worth looking precisely at the evolution 
of fanners’ income with respect to the rest of the society.
1.3.1.2 The fanners* households income
Farmers’ income has been catching up the non-farmers’ one over the last 4 decades in all 
OECD countries. Consequently, since the beginning of the 1990s, farm households’ income has become 
comparable or even sometimes higher than average income.
Hill (2000, p.215) displays some data that show how farmers’ income has caught up with that of 
non-farmers in the USA:
Hill remarks that the evolution of the farmers’ / non-farmers’ income ratio is due to an increase
of the farmers’ income faster than the increase of the non-farmers’ income. Indeed, Gardner (2000,
p. 1060), examining more recent US data, remarks that ’’the average income of farm household has grown
in the 1990s to exceed that of the average non-farm household: 59 700 $ for farm-operator households
compared to 51 900 S for the US average household in 1998”. This evolution can also be noticed in
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Japan, where ’’the incomes of farm households have risen [...] and the disparity between average farm 
and non-farm household incomes has been eliminated in recent years” (OECD, 1995, p.38).
In the European Union, the trend is globally the same, and Hill (1996a, p.39) notices that 
’’agricultural households enjoy, everywhere in the EU except Portugal, a level of disposable income per 
household above or close to the all-households average”.
However, this positive evolution has to be moderated in two ways: First, one has to be cautious 
with the household income criterion. Indeed, in all OECD countries, a farm household tends to be larger 
and to consist of more generations than the national average8. This leads to per capita results different 
from household results. For instance, in Japan, ’’while the average level o f total household income in the 
farm sector is higher by 30 % than that of the non-farm sector, [...] farm households earnings, on a per 
earner basis, are slightly lower than those of wage and salary earners as a whole, because o f the larger 
number of earners of farm households compared with urban households” (OECD, 1995, p.23). Munk 
(1997) presents the relative income of fanners as ’’the income per person employed in agriculture relative 
to the income per person employed in the economy as a whole”. Building this index on data from the 
OECD and the EU Commission, he concludes that, over the period 1980-1990, the European relative 
income o f farmers represented only 36.4 % of the income of the rest of the society. And the ratio was
41.4 % for OECD as a whole, and 64 % in the USA. Munk also notes that ’’the countries with the greatest 
disparities between agricultural incomes and non-agricultural incomes tend to provide the highest levels 
of assistance.” However, he does not deepen the analysis to investigate the causality o f this relationship.
The second moderating argument to bring to the positive evolution of farm income compared to 
non-farm income regards the composition of farm income. Indeed, more and more farmers also have 
non-farm activities, and these off-farm activities are mainly the ones that have allowed fanners’ income 
to catch up with the rest of the society. For instance, an OECD study (1998, p.47) dealing with all the 
OECD countries emphasizes that, ’’when income derived from non-farm sources is taken into account,
8 In Eurostat (1986,1990) Family Budgets-Comparative Tables, the average numbers o f persons per household were as 
follows (all households, followed by households headed by farmers and agricultural workers): Belgium 2.9, 4.2; Germany 2.4, 
4.3; Spain 3 .6 ,4 .3 ; France 2.7, 3,4; Netherlands 2 .7,4.2 (reported by Hill, 1996a, p.39).
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farm households seem to have average disposable income (i.e. after tax) on a par with the average of all 
households”. However, when the purely agricultural income is compared to the income of the other 
sectors, it usually remains lower.
These new features of the agricultural sector point to the need for a more precise description of the 
role of off-farm activities and non-farm incomes for farm households.
13.2 Impact of agricultural sector changes on income distribution
The new features of the agricultural sector, by many means, alter the distribution o f income 
between fanners and non-farmers, and also among fanners themselves. The first reason for this is the 
development of off-farm activities among fanners. Besides, agricultural liberalization also has an impact 
on agricultural income distribution. Finally, all these changes lead to an evolution o f the definition of a 
farmer.
13.2.1 Increase of off-farm work among fanners
In all OECD countries, a common trend can be noticed regarding the development of 
off-farm activities among farmers. Some differences can however be noticed: ’The larger and more 
diverse the non-agricultural rural sector, the more likely it is that farm households will be able to obtain 
a non-agricultural employment to help to maintain or increase household incomes. Likewise, the more
in?!
1
dependent a region’s economy is on fanning, [...] the less likely the operator is to work off-farm as the 
lack of alternative opportunities for the employment of farmers labor in the region provides an incentive 
for fanners to expand their farms to achieve fuller employment and higher incomes” (OECD, 1998,
P-29).
There are two main ways of taking into account the importance o f off-farm work among farmers: 
By comparing the working hours spent on the farm to total working time, or by comparing the income 
earned on the farm to total income. In terms of working time, it can be noted that, ”in the EU 12, of the
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15 million people working in agriculture in 1993, only one-quarter worked full-time” (OECD, 1998, 
p.44). Regarding the USA, in 62 % of the farm households, the farm operators primary occupation is 
not farming. In Japan, over 84 % of commercial farms are classified as part-time, meaning that one or 
more household members are engaged in jobs other than fanning. In terms o f income earned, the feature 
is even more salient: European farm households who earn their main income from off-faim activities 
are often referred to as marginal agricultural households. ’They represented in 1987, and for the EU 
12,62 % o f  the holdings, but, on average, they received only less than 10 % o f their total income from 
agriculture” (Hill, 1996a). The importance o f off-farm income can also be gauged by the fact that, while 
fanners' income has increased in the European Union for the last decade, net farm income has steadily 
decreased since 1996 by approximately 3 % each year. This shows that farmers earn an increasingly 
large share o f their total income from off-farm jobs (OECD, 2000). For the USA, Hill (2000, p.254) 
notes that ”off-farm income is important as an income source, accounting for 89 % o f household ipcome 
of farm operator households in 1995. Within this total, wages and salaries contributed 53 %, off-farm 
business income 13 %, interest and dividends 8 %, and other off-farm sources 16 %. Farming only 
provided 11 %. And only 20 % o f  farm operator households in the 1990 and the 1992 survey received 
more from their farm than their off-farm sources”. In Japan, the average share of off-farm income in 
total farm family income was 62 % in 1993 (OECD, 1995, p.15).
We have seen that farmers’ income has recently increased mainly because of the development o f 
non-farm income. However, the income distribution between farmers remains a current issue that has 
not been eliminated by the evolution o f the farmers’ / non-farmers’ income ratio. In fact, this issue has 
even become more salient with the development of off-farm activities among farmers.
1.3.2.2 Income distribution between farmers
In the European Union, ’’income disparities among agricultural households are wider than 
among households in general. Consequently, adequate average incomes among agricultural households 
may be consistent with greater relative proportions o f farm households that fall below a given poverty
34
line” (Hill, 1996c, p.87)9. This characteristic o f the farm sector has even been stressed by the 
development o f  non-faim income among farmers. Indeed, in all OECD countries, the richest fanners 
are part-time farmers, whose total income increases thanks to non-farm income. And, in the European 
Union, the ’’lowest total incomes are associated not with the smallest farms and those generating the 
smallest incomes from farming but with those somewhat larger, typically those which are too laige to be 
operated on a part-time basis but too small to generate an adequate income from farming to support a 
household” (Hill, 1996b, p.160).
In the USA, the same features can be observed: ’The total incomes of farm operator households 
are more unequally distributed than are households in general in the USA. A higher proportion of farm 
operator households were below the poverty line than all US families (21.9 % and 10.7 % respectively) 
and also more were recipients o f very high incomes (6.3 % and 4.3 %)” (Hill, 2000, p.258). More 
precisely, it can be noted that, in 1999, US farm households headed by operators whose primary 
occupation was farming had an average household income o f55 000 $, compared with 70 000 $ for farm 
households headed by operators whose primary occupation was off-farm. Hill (2000, p.254) notes that, 
in the USA, ’’the households with the highest incomes not only have substantial incomes from fanning 
(and produce nearly half of all agricultural output) but they also have the greatest average incomes from 
off-farm sources.”
In Japan, the farmers who earn ’’more than 50 % o f income [...] from non-farm jobs have the 
highest incomes. By contrast, average incomes of full-time farm households have been consistently 
lower than both part-time farm households and urban households” (OECD, 1995, p.23).
Finally, it has to be noted that, in almost all OECD countries, ’’the share of part-time farmers is 
higher than the share of fanners with other gainful activities. This raises the question of the existence 
or extent of disguised unemployment among farm households” (OECD, 1998, p.45). Indeed, for some 
farmers, farm work on only a part-time basis may be more suffered than wanted, and they may want to
9Indeed, everywhere in the European Union, excepted Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands, there are proportionally more 
poor people in the agricultural population than in the whole population. For instance, Hill (1996c) reports that, in 1988,31 %  o f 
Italian farmers were below the poverty line, compared to 23 %  o f  the whole population; in France, there were 25 %  o f  fanners 
compared to 16 %  for the whole population.
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work more in*farm but the lack o f inputs other than labor may impede them from this, and they lack job 
opportunities off-farm.
There is little doubt that there exists a relationship between the development o f off-farm activities 
and income inequalities among fanners. But the evolution of income distribution between farmers is 
also linked to the recent evolution of agricultural policies in industrialized countries. The next paragraph 
presents the different links, direct or indirect, wanted or unwanted, between agricultural policies and 
income distribution in the farm sector.
1 3 .2 3  Impact of agricultural policy reform on income distribution
The evolution o f the farm sector is characterized by a change in some income distribution 
features: There is an increase in fanners’ income compared to the rest of the society, an increase in the 
share o f off-farm activities, and an evolution of income inequalities between full-time and part-time 
farmers. The main links between income distribution features and agricultural policy measures seem to 
be threefold:
- Agricultural policy has an impact on income distribution in the farm sector;
- and, since the sector is evolving, the policy has also to evolve in order to take into account the 
new features of the sector;
- finally, because the agricultural sector is evolving, its responses to agricultural policy evolve as
well.
The first part of the link, going from agricultural policy measures to the evolution o f the sector, 
would follow several routes: First o f all, agricultural liberalization measures ’’will affect relative costs 
and profitability of the resources used in agriculture and would set in motion a dynamic adjustment 
process. Resources with higher value in alternative uses will be the first to be withdrawn from 
agricultural production. In this way, it could be expected that the brunt of adjustment would be borne by 
hired labor and borrowed capital rather than family labor ” (OECD, 1998, p.72). It would also be borne 
by land, the price of which would decrease since it has limited alternative uses. However, it is difficult
to draw straightforward conclusions about the extent o f this link and the influence o f  policy reforms on 
off-farm activity, since it would imply perfectly isolating one effect from another. Indeed, Benjamin 
and Guyomard (1994, p.81) argue that the CAP reform, and, more precisely, "the reduction in cereals 
price and the (land) set-aside would induce a decrease in the (agricultural) reservation wage, hence an 
increase in the probability of off-farm participation. On the other hand, the receipt o f the compensatory 
payment would have a negative impact on the probability of off-farm work participation. Therefore, the 
total effect is indeterminate.”
The other part o f the link between agricultural policies and the evolution o f income distribution 
would go from the new features of the agricultural sector to desirable changes in policy. The 
development o f off-farm activities probably prevents a large number o f fanners from migrating to 
non-faim jobs. But it also necessitates the implementation of adapted agricultural policies. Indeed, 
most of the existing policies aim to increase the agricultural income of farmers, who are defined as 
working exclusively on a farm. Since this framework is no longer the most common one in OECD 
countries, agricultural policies need to evolve in order to take into account the larger integration of 
farmers into the rest of the economy. Moreover, the simple goal o f  increasing farmers’ income is no 
longer justifiable since their total income is now on the same level as the average income of the whole 
society. Agricultural policies should hence be more targeted to specific farmers.
Finally, the new features o f the sector lead to different responses from fanners to policy reforms. 
Indeed, "engagement in off-farm work can have an important role during agricultural policy reform, 
cushioning farm households from income pressures which emerge from reform of agricultural policies. 
Many farm households, particularly in more remote rural areas, are dependent on a single or very 
limited farm production sources for their incomes. By enabling farm households to diversify their 
income sources, pluri-activity can contribute to diversification and lower exposure to farm-sector 
events” such as policy reforms (OECD, 1998, p.44). A more extreme point would take the reverse part 
of the proposition and argue that the development of part-time farming would give scope for a stronger
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reduction in price support with less need for equivalent compensation by direct payments since there is 
a lower dependence on farm earnings.
These three links occur simultaneously, and it is therefore difficult to identify which link is the 
most salient, or which is the one that happens first. Moreover, the impact o f agricultural policy reforms 
on income distribution also depends on inputs ownership. Indeed, agricultural sector liberalization has 
an influence on the remuneration o f  the inputs used in the sector. Therefore, depending on who owns 
these inputs, different income distribution implications can occur. It is hence necessary to have a clear 
statement about the recent trends in the use and ownership o f agricultural inputs in OECD countries.
13.2.4 Use and ownership of agricultural inputs
The impact of agricultural policy on the income of the agents through their inputs ownership 
mainly passes through labor and land. Indeed, since land is not (or hardly) mobile, its remuneration 
depends a lot on agricultural policies. As for labor, it is mobile but its movements have important social 
consequences, either in terms o f off-farm work of farmers, or in terms of farmers fully moving to the 
non-farm sector. Therefore, the influence of agricultural policies on labor is likely to lead to important 
income distribution consequences. The capital input is not studied because its remuneration does not 
depend (or very little) on agricultural policies, since it is mobile (at least in the mid-term) from one 
sector to another, and since agricultural sector has a very small weight in industrialized economies.
Therefore, the impact of agricultural policy on income distribution changes with the identity o f 
the owners o f labor and land used in the farm sector. A distinctive feature o f farm labor in OECD is the 
preponderance of family labor. In 1990, the share of family labor in French farms was 91 %. And the 
figure is more or less the same for all OECD countries, with an extreme case in Japan, where non-family 
labor represents only 0.5 % of farm labor (source: OECD, 1998). Regarding agricultural land ownership, 
direct ownership by land-user is the rule in almost all OECD countries. For instance, in the European 
Union, more than 2/3 o f agricultural land is owned by its users, and this is increasing10. For the majority
10Three countries in the European U nion are an exception to this trend: They are France, Belgium and the UK, where direct
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of European countries, the letting of private land outside the farm family is o f minor importance, and 
’’the tenancy is predominantly a short-term device used for intergenerational succession” (Ravenscroft 
et al., 1999, p .l 0). The fact that agricultural land is mainly owned by its users is, to a large extent, linked 
to the legal context o f land ownership. Indeed, the use o f land is usually highly regulated, and farm land 
can be switched, in the short run, to another use only with difficulty. However, this feature is less salient 
in the USA, where about 45 % o f cropland is rented.
Given all these features o f the agricultural sector, we can now try to give a definition o f an 
agricultural household that would represent the recent evolution o f the sector.
1.3.2.5 The changing definition of an agricultural household
The persons who are referred to as fanners do not represent the same reality now and some 
decades ago. Indeed, in most OECD countries, an agricultural household is traditionally defined as 
a household "where the main income of the reference person (usually the individual with the largest 
income) comes from independent activity in agriculture (that is, from self-employment as a farmer)” 
(Hill, 1996 a, p.34). However, according to this narrow definition, the number of agricultural households 
in all OECD countries ”is substantially smaller than the number o f households where there is some 
income from farming, and generally smaller than the number of agricultural holdings” (Hill, 2000, 
p.268). This feature obviously represents the development of off-farm activities by farm households. It 
shows that the traditional definition of a farm household became too narrow, since it excludes many 
households that are associated with agricultural holdings but where agriculture is not the main source of 
income (or occupation) of the holding head. In order to take into account these "marginal agricultural 
households” as agricultural households, a broader definition has to be considered. It would include all 
the households where any of its members earns some income from agriculture.
Therefore, before analyzing the impact of agricultural policy reforms, it is necessary to clearly 
define who is a farmer, and to answer the following question: Is a farmer someone working on a farm,
ownership is decreasing, and no longer represents the majority o f agricultural land.
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even very little, and with other off-farm activities ? Or is he someone whose main income comes from 
agricultural activities ? The answer to these questions has important consequences for the evaluation o f  
the liberalization policies. Indeed, ”if  assistance for income support is to be directed at those who derive 
most o f  their income from farming, it means that many households who operate holdings will be deemed 
to fall outside the sphere o f interest o f  agricultural policy. This will mainly involve the smallest holdings”  
(Hill, 1996b, p. 160). This is one o f  the reasons why the evolution of the European agricultural sector 
makes an adaptation o f the agricultural policy necessary, otherwise it will become ever more unfair. 
Indeed, ’’the general low income dependence of small farms on farming, coupled with their relatively 
small volumes of output, imply that the present system of income support is highly inefficient in terms o f  
welfare transfer. Under current commodity support regimes, a very high proportion o f transfers accrue 
to a relatively small proportion o f fanners - those who are the largest producers.” (Hill, 1996b, p.160).
Considering the evolution o f off-farm activities of many farmers households, and the land 
ownership features of the European Union, two specifications o f an agricultural household appear 
relevant in order to study the distributive impact o f agricultural policy. They are the following:
- An agricultural household is a household which owns some land. It can split its working time 
between farming and non-farming activities, it will remain an agricultural household, provided a small 
amount o f resources (in input) continues to'be dedicated to the agricultural sector. This definition would 
take into account marginal agricultural households. With this definition, the proportion of fanners 
(agricultural households) in the society would not change in the short run with agricultural policy. 
Indeed, land-owners would take some time before deciding to sell their land. And it is realistic to think 
about land-owners as always dedicating some part o f their labor (and hence as always earning some 
income) to (from) the agricultural sector. When the sector is liberalized, it may become less profitable 
to work in it, and land-owners may dedicate more work-time to off-farm jobs. Nevertheless, they would 
still be regarded as farmers11. We now turn to the second way o f defining a farmer.
11 It is realistic to assume that they w ill not totally abandon on-farm work. Indeed, once farmers, people usually only stop 
farm ing because they grow old o r face bankruptcy.
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- An agricultural household is a household which allocates (the main part of) its labor to the 
agricultural sector. It corresponds to the traditional definition, where an agricultural household is a 
household whose head earns the main part o f  his income on the farm. Following this definition, the 
proportion o f farmers (agricultural households) in the economy evolves with agricultural policy, since 
some resources (inputs) are moved from the agricultural sector to other sectors when the agricultural 
sector is liberalized. Indeed, someone who reduces his work-time on a farm to increase his work-time in 
off-farm jobs may, according to this definition, stop being a farmer and become a non-farmer.
The first definition seems to be more realistic nowadays, since the large majority of the fanners in 
OECD countries are part-time farmers but still own the land they work on. However, many agricultural 
policy measures are still designed for a context in which agricultural households dedicate all their 
work-time to fanning. Hence, some agricultural measures might now be unsuitable.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the evolution of agricultural policies in many OECD countries is 
towards less public intervention. This evolution of the policies is, at the same time, a cause and an effect 
of the evolution o f the farm sector towards farmers being less and less full-time fanners. This evolution 
has been presented in this chapter for industrialized countries. The last chapter of the thesis shows that 
this evolution also occurs in developing countries. In industrialized countries, this trend is mainly due 
to the fact that less and less labor is needed in the agricultural sector and that off-farm jobs are often 
better remunerated. However, part-time farmers remain linked to the sector by land ownership and 
other cultural features. This evolution makes necessary to change the way to think about and to define a 
fanner in industrialized countries. It also makes necessary to change the agricultural policy instruments. 
It is actually what is done in the European Union, with the reforms o f the Common Agricultural Policy. 
On an income distribution perspective, the results of these liberalization measures change according to 
the definition given to a fanner. Indeed, depending on whether a farmer is defined as someone working
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full or part time in the agricultural sector, different instruments will have different effects on his welfare. 
Therefore, agricultural policy has to adapt to the evolution o f the farm sector, but it also has to define 
precisely to whom it is directed. The next two chapters study how the effects on income distribution o f  
different liberalization policies change when a farmer is defined more or less realistically as working 
exclusively in the agricultural sector or only partially.
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Chapter 2
A model of agricultural liberalization in the European Union
2.1 Introduction
The first chapter has presented the reforms of the European Common Agricultural Policy 
which took place in the 1990s. The present chapter gives a quantitative assessment of the welfare 
consequences of these agricultural liberalization measures in the European Union. It is done in a 
two-sector neoclassical general equilibrium model. The welfare of two representative agents (fanner 
and non-farmer) is assessed in terms of permanent consumption, and is compared when different 
agricultural policies are implemented, for different definitions of a farmer. Indeed, as presented in 
the first chapter, according to the reality one wants the ’’farm households” to represent, the results of 
agricultural policy reforms change. The model developed in this chapter permits to identify the best 
agricultural instruments and their sequencing of implementation according to the objectives of the 
society. It shows that, even though the number of European farmers is small, the debate over whether it 
is justifiable to compensate them for liberalization measures in their sector, and how it should be done, 
is not only a political and social problem, but an economic one as well.
The next section o f  this chapter very briefly presents a literature review o f  the models assessing 
welfare consequences o f the agricultural sector liberalization. Section 3 develops the specifications of 
the model built to answer our issues, while section 4 describes how it is solved. Section 5 explains the 
different scenarios of liberalization studied. Sections 6 describes the results given by the model and 
section 7 concludes.
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2.2 A brief literature review
Models used to assess the consequences of agricultural sector liberalization can be 
distinguished according to their technical features or according to their results (these two things are 
in fact often linked). General equilibrium models study the impact o f  agricultural liberalization on 
the whole economy. Partial equilibrium models are only applied to the agricultural sector, or to one 
agricultural product, and consider the other sectors’ characteristics as exogenous. Many models are 
multi-countries general equilibrium models12. Some mono-country models also exist, and often focus on 
large developing countries13. Models applied to industrialized countries are usually partial equilibrium 
models14. Some o f these models have results in favor of a complete agricultural liberalization, claiming 
that it will ensure a net gain for all countries. Others show that liberalization may be harmful to 
developing countries, or to some social groups, at least in the short run. Last, some models have 
results showing that liberalization would not change significantly what is considered as the main issue 
of agricultural world markets: Price volatility, which is regarded by the authors of these models as 
endogenous15.
Models* results depend on their technical specifications, so one has to be cautious when 
interpreting these results. For instance, many of the models stating that liberalization is welfare 
improving are partial equilibrium models: By construction, agricultural price policy decreases global 
welfare by increasing distortions. Even if  some social groups lose out on agricultural liberalization, they 
can be compensated for by the gains obtained by other social groups in the same country16. Models 
stating that some countries or some social groups may lose out on agricultural liberalization are both
12cf, for instance, Harrison, Rutherford and Tai t  (1995), Francois, Mac Donald and Nordstrom (1994) or Goldin, Knudsen 
and van der Mensbrugghe ( 1993).
13cf, for instance, Anderson (1998), W an (1997), Islam and Thomas (1996) or M artin and Winters (1996).
14c f  Henrichsmeyer and Witzke (2000), Parry (1999), Roger (1999), OECD (1998), Folmer and Keyser and al.(l995), 
Moschini and Sckokai (1994).
l s This literature argues that any nonlinearity in supply or demand functions may lead to chaotic prices or quantities series, 
even in a deterministic model (c f Burton 1993, Chavas and Holt 1993, Boussard 1996). Hence, liberalization would not change 
this feature.
16These statements are developed, inter alia, by Bale and Lutz (1979), Sarris and Freebaim  (1983), Miranda and Helmbergcr 
(1988), Anderson and Tyers ( 1993).
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partial and general equilibrium ones. However, for partial equilibrium models, only dynamic ones arrive 
at these kinds of conclusions17. These models show that agricultural policy may be, in some cases, 
welfare improving, mainly by reducing price volatility.
In this literature, very few general equilibrium models have been specifically applied to 
industrialized countries. In fact, Chambers (1995) notes that, "although farm programs are ubiquitous, 
relatively little formal analysis has been devoted to their incidence upon the rest of the economy.
And even though studies of agricultural pricing policies in developing countries routinely account for 
general equilibrium interactions, any analysis that has been done for developed countries has been 
largely restricted to single-sector, partial equilibrium analysis based upon the comparison o f Harberger 
triangles” (p. 318). In fact, even though die agricultural sector is small in industrialized countries, 
the development of a general equilibrium model would appear to be useful since the links between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are important: Agricultural sector liberalization may induce 
income effects on the whole economy, as a result of resource reallocation across sectors. Moreover, 
agricultural sector liberalization has an impact on government budget, since agricultural policies often 
weigh more heavily in governments’ budgets than one might expect given the percentage o f fanners in 
labor force.
2.3 Presentation o f the model
2.3.1 General presentation of the economy
The model represents the European Union in a general equilibrium framework that allows 
all the feedbacks and indirect effects of agricultural policies to be taken into account. Indeed, in 
industrialized countries, agricultural policy mainly aims at redistributing income from consumers or 
tax-payers to agricultural producers, therefore all the facets o f  the economy are concerned. Countries
17cfC hauveau and Gordon (1988), Zw art and Btandford (1989), Scandizzo (1992), W ait (1997) and Anderson (1998).
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are not distinguished inside the European Union since we are interested into agricultural policies (which 
are the same in all EU countries) and into the definition o f the farmers (which does not depend on 
countries). Therefore, the European Union is represented as a large open economy, and the rest o f 
the world is not modeled. Since the studied economy is open, there is room for trade policy, such 
as export subsidies or import taxes. And since it is a large economy, interest rate and relative prices 
are endogenously determined. Indeed, the market clearing value of the agricultural relative price 
(when there is no government intervention) serves as a benchmark in the simulations o f the changes in 
agricultural policy: It is used as a proxy o f world price. Indeed, since the European Union is a large 
exporter of agricultural products, it plays an important role in world markets.
The model is made up o f two sectors: Each one produces an aggregate homogenous good. One 
sector represents the agricultural part of the economy (sector 1), whereas all the other activities are 
aggregated in the non-agricultural sector (sector 2). The non-agricultural good is taken as numeraire.
In each sector, a representative producer-consumer is modelled: He produces only one product but 
consumes both. Each representative agent represents a group of persons: The representative agent 
named as ’’farmer” represents all the fanners of the society, while the representative agent named 
as ’’non-farmer” represents all the non-farmers of the society. The agricultural sector is studied 
as a whole, rather than distinguishing between specific crops. This is justified by the fact that the 
elasticity of substitution between different agricultural products is much higher than the elasticity of 
substitution between agricultural and non-agricultural products in the agents’ consumption. Although 
this simplification removes a part o f the complexity of agricultural policies, it allows for a more general 
view o f the agricultural sector and policies. The resulting model is simpler than it would have been 
if  different groups o f  agricultural products had been included, and it is easier to understand the links 
between different effects of a policy. Since only one agricultural good is considered, this good is 
assumed to be a normal one. Therefore, Giffen effects are excluded. Endowments are assumed to be 
exogenous; they regard only inputs, not produced goods. Leisure is not taken into account in the model, 
and hence so nor are labor supply decisions in each household.
>
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European stylized facts show that the European domestic price of agricultural products is between 
20 and 40 % higher than world price. This price wedge between the market clearing price and the 
exogenous price set by agricultural policies (or between the world price and the domestic price), can be 
either due to price support scheme or to tariffs or quotas (the quota case is not specifically studied here 
since it has been shown that, in a Walrassian equilibrium, it is always possible to find a tariff equivalent 
to a quota18). It is assumed that only the home country taxes imports and subsidizes exports. Therefore 
it is abstracted from any retaliation behavior. It is also assumed that economic policy only consists in 
acting in the agricultural sector, so that the domestic price of the non-agricultural good is the same as its 
world market price. It is assumed that all goods are mobile internationally, while inputs are not, and that 
there is no international ownership o f input. Therefore, the possibility of international capital transfers 
to fund temporary imbalances in trade is ruled out. All these assumptions, more or less realistic, are 
justified by our goal of studying agricultural policy effects on income distribution. Therefore, the 
features o f  the European economy with little link with this issue are not modeled here.
The market clearing condition in the agricultural sector is:
Y i = C i  + N X i  (2 .1)
Since agricultural price depends on agricultural policy, it is exogenous and hence does not play its 
role of connection between supply and demand. Therefore, some surplus (net exports) N X i may exist 
(it is a surplus and not a deficit because the agricultural price is set at a level higher than the market 
clearing one). This surplus represents the difference between domestic production (Vi) and domestic 
consumption (Ci); actually this difference is not necessarily exported, and can be kept in stock. 
However, in both cases, there is a cost for the domestic government, representing either the export 
subsidy or the stock cost (it is assumed for simplicity that these two costs are equal).
18 c f  Sum ner 2000, Alston, Carter and Smith 1993. However, tariff and quota are not equivalent when considering income 
distribution, that might be different in the two cases due to the appropriation o f the quota rent. The quota case is not taken into 
account in this paper but should be developed in further analysis.
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It is assumed that all investments are in non-agricultural goods, leading to the following market 
clearing condition in the non-agricultural sector (5 represents the depreciation rate o f capital)
y2 =  C2+ K  +SK + N X 2 (2.2)
The non-agricultural production (Y2 ) has to be equal to the consumption of non-agricultural goods 
(C2) , the net exports of agricultural products ( N X 2 ) and the investments (K=  represents the 
increase of capital over time, and 6K  represents the renewal o f depreciated capital).
A flexible exchange rate is assumed, and the trade balance is :
p N X  1 +  N X 2 =  0 (2.3)
for p representing the relative price of the agricultural product.
The government budget constraint is:
(p -  pw) N X i  + tYi +  N T  = 0 (2.4)
This equation means that the agricultural net exports ( N X  1) are subsidized at a rate equal to the wedge 
between domestic (p) and world price (pw). These subsidies are funded by negative net transfers 
(equivalent to net taxes) coming from the agents (NT  >  0 is a net transfer from the government to 
the agents; if N T  < 0, it is a tax paid by the agents to the government). These taxes are also used to 
subsidize agricultural production at the rate r .
23.2 The supply side
Production technologies in each sector are represented by Cobb-Douglas functions. This 
is of course a limitation since it assumes that the elasticity o f substitution between the inputs is 1. 
However, the choice of a Cobb-Douglas technology may be a valuable first approximation of a problem. 
This approximation is actually quite widespread in the agricultural economics literature dealing with 
welfare questions, and seems to lead to little difference in results compared to those obtained with
M B
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estimated functional forms 19. The obvious advantage o f a Cobb-Douglas specification is that it allows 
for simplifications in computations and calibrations.
Both sectors are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. In the case o f the non-agricultural 
sector, this is justified by the fact that it is made of so many different sectors that, on average, there are 
constant returns to scale. Many agricultural economists also agree on this assumption for the agricultural 
sector in the long run 20. In fact, it has been suggested that lack of economies of scale and constant 
returns to scale are the primary reason why firms in agriculture are smaller than firms in industry. 
Moreover, one can observe that, in the same country, a large number of farms o f different sizes can 
coexist for a long time within a common economic environment. Considering the aggregate agricultural 
output, the unit cost o f  production hence seems to be quite independent of the output size21.
The same technological trend is incorporated in the two production functions and it is assumed 
to have the same growth rate in both sectors. Indeed, over the last twenty years, in the most advanced 
countries, agricultural factor productivity (output per unit o f input) has been increasing faster than 
productivity in the rest o f the economy (cf Ruttan and Hay ami, 1985; Antonelli and Quadrio-Curzio, 
1988, introductory chapters). This may reflect the fact that the agricultural sector had to catch up with 
the rest of the economy in terms o f productivity. As this catch-up cannot last for decades, it is assumed 
in this model that this adjustment is finished, and therefore that there is a common technological factor 
Z  in both sectors. Moreover, this simplification could be justified by the assumption o f investment- 
embodied technological change (cf Solow, 1960; Hercowitz, 1998): The main part o f  technological 
change goes through new investments, no matter in which sector they take place. Hence, sector-specific 
technological change (disembodied) is o f minor importance.
Technological change is assumed to be Harrod-neutral, meaning that it is labor and land- 
augmenting: Technological change raises the output in the same way as an increase in labor or land.
19cfNewbery(1987, p.13).
20c f  Johnson and Ruttan (1994, p.692).
21cfBoussard(1988).
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This kind o f neutrality of the technological change is needed in neo-classical growth model in order to 
stay consistent with the existence o f a steady state.
The law o f  motion of the technological change Z is represented by:
Z
Z h
where Z —
In steady state, all the variables only grow at the rate of this technological progress. Hence, in 
order to get the value of the steady state variables, some new variables have to be defined as the initial 
ones divided by the technological trend Z, such that the new variables become stationary in the steady 
state situation.
Agricultural production function uses capital (Kx), labor (Lx) and land (T). The non-agricultural 
production uses only capital (K2) and labor (L2). Capital and labor are perfectly mobile across sectors 
(which is justified at least in the long run), and are assumed to be always fully employed (unemployment 
does not enter into our concern o f  evaluation o f  the agricultural policies). Land is an immobile fixed 
factor assumed to be fully used, at least at the sector level (it may be mobile between farms, however). 
Its value is calibrated in order to get a realistic value of the agricultural / non-agricultural productions 
ratio. The capital is the only accumulable input because it is abstracted from demographic growth (since 
it is quite small in industrialized countries). In both sectors, capital is assumed to depreciate at the same 
rate S.
The agricultural production function has the following shape:
Yi =  F ( Z L UK U ZT )  =  (Z ìi)*  (A i)’  (Z T ) 1 -0 " 7 (2.5)
0 <  a  < 1
0 <  7  <  1
0 <  a  +  7  <  1
The non-agricultural production function is:
Y2 ~  G{ZL2, K 2) =  {ZL2f  {K2f ~ 0 (2.6)
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2.33 The demand side
The same intertemporal utility function is defined for both representative agents:
rOO
U* — ƒ exp (-pt) hi In C\t +  (1 — //) In C^] df (2.7)
Jo
for i: A or NA (farmer or non-farmer);
p, represents the share of agricultural products in consumption; 0 <  p < 1. 
p is the rate of time preference, which is assumed to be the same for both representative agents. 
The arguments o f the utility function are the consumption levels of agricultural (C i) and 
non-agricultural goods (C2), since it is assumed that the agents do not value leisure. The same utility 
function is used for both representative agents. Indeed, in industrialized countries, it is difficult to 
distinguish between farmers and non-farmers according to their consumption level o f agricultural 
and non-agricultural aggregate goods: It has been shown in the first chapter that a European farm 
household is not poorer than an average household of the society. Regarding utility function, instead o f  
a distinction between farmers and non-farmers, a more relevant distinction would be between ’’rich” 
and ’’poor”, whether farmers or not, as the ’’poor” consume relatively more agricultural goods than the 
’’rich”22. However, the ’’poor” in Europe are usually not ’’poor enough” to justify such a distinction, as 
their relative consumption of agricultural goods is not very different from that o f the ’’rich”. So, only 
one type of utility function is defined.
The budget constraint of each agent is such that the present value of consumption and investment 
equals the present value o f income, i.e. wealth. Each agent receives (or pays) some net transfers from (to) 
the government. These are assumed to be lump-sum transfers and not to depend on wealth or income o f 
the agents. This simple framework is coherent with the goal o f assessing welfare modifications between 
farmers and non-farmers, without distinguishing different level o f  income or wealth inside each group.
22The "poor" are usually defined as people whose income is below poverty threshold, i.e. below half the whole society 
median income. As food demand is quite inelastic to income, it represents a larger share in ’’poor” budget than in "rich” one.
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The agents receive a remuneration from renting their inputs (labor, capital and land). Each agent 
owns some assets Ai  (i = A, NA, standing for ’’farmer”, ’’non-farmer”) made up of capital used in 
agricultural and /  or in non-agricultura! sectors; hence we have, for all t:
A  = K  — K\  +  K 2 — A a -f Aft a (2.8)
for K \  -  capital used in the agricultural sector 
K -2 -  capital used in the non-agricultural sector 
A a  ~ capital (asset) owned by the fanner 
A n a -  capital (asset) owned by the non-farmer.
A —K  is needed for all t. However, A a may be different from K u  as well as A n a  may be 
different from K 2 . It means that the capital owned by the farmer may be growing at a different rate than 
the capital used in the agricultural sector (and reciprocally for the non-farmer and the non-agricultural 
sector), since fanners and non-farmers do not necessarily invest in their own sector. Indeed, since the 
remuneration rate o f  capital is the same in both sectors, households are indifferent between the two 
sectors when investing. It has already been noticed that, in the European Union, it is meaningless to 
distinguish between fanners and non-farmers according to their wealth. Hence, the assets A a and A na  
are initially fixed such that, in the reference situation without government intervention, the per capita 
permanent consumption levels are equal. This assumption is justified by the fact that the aim of the 
paper is to study the wealth (and hence the welfare) distribution evolution after a change in agricultural 
policy. Hence, to evaluate these changes, it is more convenient to start from an initial situation where 
wealth per capita is fairly distributed.
We have seen in the first chapter that the agents can be defined in two ways: A farmer can be 
someone owning the land, even if he works very little in the farm sector; or he can be defined as 
someone working exclusively in a farm. And reciprocally for a non-farmer. The next two sections 
distinguish these two cases.
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23.3.1 The agents are only defined according to their inputs ownership
In this case, the distinction between fanners and non-farmers only consists in the fact that farmers 
own the land, while non-farmers do not. It is assumed that the number o f fanners and non-farmers in the 
society is constant in the shoit-run. Each o f the two representative agents is endowed with an amount of 
labor corresponding to the share o f its group in the labor force. Therefore, it is assumed that this labor 
ownership distribution is constant over time. As the total amount o f labor in the model is normalized 
to 1 and since demographic growth is not taken into account, it is assumed that the farmer owns 4 % 
o f labor (L a  = 0.04) while the non-farmer owns 96 % (Lna  — 0.96). These figures represent the 
actual share o f farmers and non-farmers in European labor force. Net transfers are distributed among 
agents according to their fixed weight in the society as well. Hence, the net transfers received (or 
paid) by farmers (NTA) are such that N T A = La * N T  -  0.04 N T ,  and, for non-farmers, we have: 
N T n a  — Liva * N T  — 0.96 NT.  The same distribution is assumed for wealth: A  a = L a  * A  = 0.04 
A t and A n a  ~  Lna  * A  =  0.96 A.
The growing share of farmers having a part-time job in the non-agricultural sector is represented 
by the fact that the labor used in the non-agricultural sector (£ 2) is not necessarily owned by the 
non-farmer (£ 2 is not necessarily equal to L n a * neither L\  and L a )- Since it is much more likely to 
observe "farmers” working off-farm rather than "non-farmers” working in the agricultural sector, it is 
likely to observe: £2 >  L n a  and L\ < £ a*
I n  t h i s  context, t h e  fanner’s intertemporal budget c o n s t r a i n t  is:
f  exp (—pt) [NTa  (£) +  ro (t) L a +  <? (0  T  +  T (*) ¿ a  (*)1 dt (2.9)
Jo
= j  exp (—pt) £A a  (£) +  6Aa  (t) +  C2 (*) P (0  (i)j dt
for A a  (0 ) =  A ao
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and the non-farmer’s one is:
/  +  (2.10)
Jo
*00
=  exp (~pt) +6 A na  (t) +  C g A (t) +  p  (t ) C * A (*)] dt
for An a  (0) =
for r ,  to and q: rental rates of capital, labor and land respectively;
p =  rate of preference for the present;
for p = relative price o f the agricultural product
From these intertemporal budget constraints, we get the permanent consumption (P C ) streams of 
the agents, actualized at the interest rate.
For the farmer:
PC a = A a + - L a + - T  + ^ -  (2.11)r r t
For the non-farmer:
P C s  a — A n a  H— Lna  4------ —  (2 .12). r  r
The whole society permanent consumption is defined as the sum of the two agents’ permanent 
consumption levels:
P C  = P C  a +  PCn a  (2.13)
We now turn to the other definition of the agents, and examine what it changes in the determination 
of their permanent consumption streams.
233,2  The agents are defined according to the sector in which they work
In addition to the previous definition where the farmers’ group was defined as the land owners, 
they are now more restrictively defined as the group of persons working exclusively in the agricultural 
sector (and reversely for the non-farmers, as the persons working exclusively in the non-agricultural 
sector). The permanent consumption level o f the farmers’ group becomes:
P C  A =  A a  +  - L i  + 1 t + —  (2.14)r r  t
SI
The fixed number of farmers in the society (LA) is replaced by a variable number o f persons working 
in the agricultural sector (L{). Since in this definition a farmer is someone working in the farm sector, 
its labor is represented by the labor used in the agricultural sector (L\Y As a consequence o f this new 
definition of the agents, the definition of net transfers changes as well:
NTa = L x * N T  (2.15)
And the amount o f asset owned by the fanners becomes:
A a — L \ *  A  (2.16)
And the same applies to the non-farmers* group; their permanent consumption level becomes:
PCNA =  Ana + - ¿ 2  + (2-17)r  r
for
N T na  = L 2 * N T  (2.18)
Ana  =  L>2 * A  (2.19)
If a farmer becomes a non-farmer, he sells his land to other fanners, so land remuneration remains inside 
the fanners’ group. Hence permanent consumption levels of the whole groups o f farmers or non-farmers 
is not affected by this transaction, since land remuneration is always part o f the fanners* group income. 
Proceeds o f land sale received by a fanner when he becomes non-farmer are not taken into account 
because it is assumed that each farmer only owns a small amount o f land, and its sale represents only 
a small portion of the agent’s income. When a farmer becomes a non-farmer, he keeps his asset A, 
therefore the asset ownership of one group of agents (farmers or non-farmers) is always represented by 
the share o f this group in the labor force times the global level o f asset in the economy.
Since the model has now been fully described, its resolution is presented in the next section.
2.4 Resolution of the model
Before solving the model, some normalizations are done such that the main endogenous variables
get divided by the technical change, in order to obtain their steady state value. The model can then be
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solved analytically for steady state. As suggested by some stylized facts, it is assumed that one sector 
(the non-agricultural) is always more capital-intensive than the other (the agricultural); the steady state 
is therefore ensured to be stable and uniquely determined (cf Uzawa, 1962, p.40). Practically, the model 
is first solved for its competitive equilibrium, which allows to give the optimal resources allocation 
between the two sectors and the two agents. The model is then solved for the social planer program, 
which gives the global level of capital and consumption in the economy. The model is finally calibrated 
for the values o f the European economy and liberalization scenarios are run.
2.4.1 Some definitions and normalizations
U JS l .  k = * = * -
kl L i Z ’ *2 L2Z ’ LZ
(2.20)
Yi Y2
Vl L XZ '  Vi L2Z
(2.21)
1—a—T
(2.22)
'■ (* " £ )  •  P P  - '( » ■ • £ ) -  '■ (* -£ )  *■ -  '■ (»■ 0  T : 11»
(* -0 -
0 /
dki
(2.24)
(2.25)
1/2 =  p (* 2) =  (fc) 
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1-0 (2.26)
— L- finnri
9i{k7) = ^ ^ = g { k 2 ) - g 2{k2) (2.27)
92 (fc2) =
dg(k2)
d{k2)
c * - £ £  ¿  =  £ £
** LZ’ °* LZ
rNA c NAy,NA _  V|__ NA _  ^2
1 ~ T z ’ *  -  LZ
X -  AZL, <f> =  <&ZL, ip =  9ZL
L a +  L na  ~  L i + L 2 = L = l
o  k —  L \k i  +  L2k2
(2.28)
(2.29)
(2.30)
(2.31)
(2.32)
(2.33)
2.4.2 The competitive equilibrium problem
Solution to the maximization problem of consumers and producers is uniquely determined by
the first order conditions and the transversality conditions. Indeed, since preferences are concave and
technologies are convex, second order conditions for an interior solution are always satisfied. In order
to study the impact of agricultural policy on endogenous variables, these variables must be expressed as
functions o f the policy instruments p, r  and o f the parameters. The model is first solved for a situation
where there is no government intervention, which allows the market clearing price to be determined.
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The values of the variables are then determined in other situations in which the price becomes higher 
than the market clearing price and in which there is a subsidy to production.
2.4.2.1 The production side
Max  IIi — (1 +  t) pF{ZL\ ,K \ ' ,ZT)  — mLi — r K \  — qT (2.34)
M ax  II2 — G {ZI/2 tJC2 ) — “coL2 — TK2 (2.35)
The first order conditions gives:
( l  +  r ) p / 3 ( f c i , f - )  =  î  ( 2 3 6 )1*1
(1 + T )ph{ku j - )  = a  =  S ife )  (2.37)
0- + r )p h (k u j^ )  = T = gi(k2) (238)
Since capital and labor are mobile between the two sectors, their marginal productivity after 
implementation o f the agricultural instruments need to be equal.
2.4.2.2 The consumption side
For the fanner
st
The first order conditions give:
1 e~pt [p log C ,4  +  (1 -  p) log C$) dt (2.39)
w L a + qT + N T  a -  pC* -  C* (2.40)
3
b h (2.41)
1 - / *  A
c ,4 = A
(2.42)
i  , c- = p - r +S (2.43)
for A : shadow price of the asset accumulated by the fanner.
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F or the non-farm er
Max Ufta  (C ? ‘\  C " A) =  ƒ  e '*  [ / i t o g l i " 1 +  (1 -  u) logC ? A]
St
A n a — (r -  6)  A n a  +  w in a  +  p C ^ A C ^ A
The first order conditions give:
=
= $
C ? A
l - f *
c ? A
$  , c¥ = p - r  +  i
dt (2.44)
(2.45)
(2.4«)
(2.47)
(2.48)
for $  : shadow price of the asset accumulated by the non-fanner.
2.43 The social planner program
Max f °  t~ *  (UA (Cj4, C24) 6 +  UNA (C ?A, C ? A) (1 -  6)) dt (249)
Jo
for b: weight o f the farmers, 1-b: weight of the non-farmers 
subject to the market clearing conditions:
C f  = F ( Z L UK UZT)  -  C ? A -  N X x (2*5°)
K  = - Ô K  + G ( Z L 2yK 2) - C f - C ? A - N X 2 <151)
The Hamiltonian of this program is:
H  =  e~ft (UA [ F ( Z L u K u  ZT) -  C ? A -  N X u C f )  b + UNA (C ?A,C ? A) (1 -  t>)j2-52) 
( -S K  + G ( Z { L  — L \ ) , ( K  — Ki) )  -  C?  -  C ? A -  N X 2) 
for ’î ' : shadow price of capital accumulation.
The first order conditions o f the Hamiltonian are directly expressed for the variables divided by 
the technological trend:
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#  =  0 « .
6(1  ~u)
J - *
(2.53)
CNA
=  K  and 2.31,2.42 and 2.47 gives:
(2.54)
fc c , 9 (^2) (1 - £ 1) l - u  f \  _ l \  n x 2 . (2.55)
~  = P  + 6 + h - g 2 {k2)
=  0  gives:
(2.56)
■ j / i  ~ jr\ -  VS: (fc2) =  0
| ^ = 0 gives:
(2.57)
^ 2  - ipg2 (fc2) =  0
2.4.4 The steady state
(2.58)
The model is solved for its 20 endogenous variables:
fcl) Cl i C2i Ci A,C2 A,\<(>, ii),nt,nxi,nx2 
Using the 20 equations representing the heart of the model:
The two production functions (equations 2.22 and 2.26), the labor normalization (equation 2.32), 
the 5 FOC on the production side (equations 2.36, 2.37 and 2.38), 4 FOC on the consumption side 
(equations 2.41,2.42,2.46 and 2.47), the 2 market clearing conditions (equations 2.50 and 2.51), 4 FOC 
of the social planner program (equations 2.55,2.56,2.57 and 2.58), the trade balance (equation 2.3) and 
the government budget constraint (equation 2.4).
The model is first solved analytically, and some values are then applied to the parameters. The 
detailed route to solve the model is presented in the appendix A, and the values of the parameters are 
presented in the next section.
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2.4.5 Values of the parameters
The model period is one year, and all parameter values are reported in yearly terms. The 
stylized facts o f the European society show that the share o f food in households’ expenditure (/¿) seems 
to have an asymptotic level close to 16 % (cf INSEE, 2000 a, b, c). Although the share o f food is 
higher than the share of agricultural products in households’ consumption, food is considered here to 
be roughly equivalent to agricultural products. According to the stylized facts, the growth rate of the 
technological trend (h) is set to 1.15 %. The rate of preference for the present (p) is the same for both 
agents and is set to 3 %, while the depreciation rate o f capital (5) is set to 10 %, as is usually done in the 
literature. Hence we have:
6 P h
0.1 0.03 0.015 0.16
On the production side, the stylized facts show that, in the agricultural sector, the share of labor 
income is around 60 % (a), the share of capital is around 20 % (7 ), and the share of land is also 20 % 
(1 — a  — 7 ). Stylized facts also show that the share o f  labor income in the non-agricultural sector is 
around 2/3 (7?) and the share of capital is around 1/3 (1 — 0). Hence we get:
a 0 7
0.6 0.67 0.2
Assuming slightly different factor shares does not significantly change the results o f the scenarios 
of the model.
When the model is solved for these values of the parameters, it gives values of the steady 
state variables that reflect the corresponding quantities of the European data (agricultural production 
represents between 2 and 8 % of total GDP, according to the agricultural policies implemented, and the 
agricultural labor force accounts for 1 to 4 % of total labor force).
These values of the parameters are applied to the analytical solution o f the model, and some 
liberalization scenarios can then be run.
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2.5 Agricultural liberalization measures
Changes in endogenous variables values are studied while different agricultural policy 
reforms are implemented: The suppression o f a price support scheme, its replacement by production 
subsidies and by some lump-sum transfers to agricultural producers. These measures are actually the 
ones implemented in the CAP reforms and presented in the first chapter. More precisely, changes in 
endogenous variables are first examined for the situation when the price support scheme is eliminated 
and nothing else is implemented to compensate the fanners for (however, if  this scheme leads to an 
increase of the global welfare of the society, some direct payments could be given to fanners, depending 
on political considerations). This would be a complete one-step liberalization measure. Afterwards, a 
more progressive measure is studied, in which the price support scheme is first replaced by deficiency 
payments so that farmers keep the same production price. In a second step, this deficiency payments 
scheme is removed as well, and possibly replaced by direct payments.
In these scenarios, the welfare changes of the agents are assessed through changes in their 
permanent consumption levels, expressed as a share of their initial levels. This method follows Lucas 
(1987, chapter 3, p.20-31) and limits discussion to changes affecting consumption of goods-in-general, 
and hence abstracts from issues involving changes in the proportion o f each good in total consumption. 
The rate of change o f permanent consumption is assessed using the chain-weighting method (Steindel, 
1995): Permanent consumption nominal levels are computed by using initial and final situations’ prices. 
Change rates are then computed for the two kinds o f permanent consumption nominal levels. The 
change rate used in the chain-weighting method is the average between these two change rates. If, after 
the implementation o f a new policy, permanent consumption increases for the whole society, it means 
that the tested measures can pass the Kaldor (1939) test: Social efficiency can potentially be improved, 
as one agent’s gains can be used to compensate the other agent’s losses so that eveiyone’s welfare is 
increased. Whether this compensation scheme (under the form o f direct payments) is implemented or 
not mainly depends on political considerations.
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The next sections present a detailed examination o f the scenarios representing the studied 
liberalization measures.
2.5.1 F irst scenario: Elimination of the price support level
In the initial situation of this scenario, the domestic relative price of the agricultural product 
is 40 % higher than its market price. The domestic price is the same for producers and consumers, 
therefore consumers directly pay for farmers’ income supplement. As the price is not competitive and 
hence does not allow market to clear, there are some surpluses. They are either exported thanks to a 
government-funded subsidy, or they are kept in stock. The export subsidy is equal to the wedge between 
the domestic and the world market price. As a first approximation, the cost of the stock is assumed to be 
equal to this wedge as well. The liberalization measure consists in decreasing the internal agricultural 
relative price so that it reaches (or at least moves closer to) the world market price. In the final situation, 
the domestic price has decreased by 40 %, and hence exports do not need to be subsidized any longer. 
The scenario thus consists in studying the reaction of all the endogenous variables when the agricultural 
price decreases by 40 %.
2.5.2 Second scenario: Deficiency payments instead of price support
It may be quite unsustainable (from the farmer’s point o f view, and hence from a political 
point o f  view as well) to implement directly a complete liberalization of the agricultural sector, as in 
the first scenario. In the present scenario, some deficiency payments compensate (temporarily) the 
farmers for a 40 % decrease in price support. Deficiency payments are modeled as a subsidy applied to 
production at a rate r .  Hence, before the reform, the situation is the same as the initial situation in the 
previous scenario, with a domestic agricultural price 40 % higher than the market clearing one. In the 
reformed situation, the price decrease by 40 %, but, in order to compensate fanners for liberalization o f
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their sector, they receive a 40 % subsidy to production23. Hence, when these measures are implemented, 
the main funding burden o f the agricultural policy shifts from consumers to tax-payers, who now pay 
for deficiency payments, whereas they previously paid only for surplus subsidies (more precisely, for 
net export subsidies and stock management). Taxes in the initial situation of this scenario were thus far 
less important than they are in the final situation, since taxes have now to fund the whole production 
subsidies, whereas they previously funded only the part of the production which was not consumed.
The government can also choose to implement a partial compensation program, so that deficiency 
payments do not compensate entirely the fall in the agricultural relative price ( r  =  0.2  for instance, 
instead o f 0.4). This is referred to as the ’’second bis” scenario.
2.53 Third scenario: Reduction in the level of deficiency payments
This scenario can be thought of as the continuation of the previous one: Price support scheme 
was first replaced by deficiency payments (second scenario), which are then eliminated (third scenario), 
so that the sector becomes fully liberalized. In the initial situation o f this scenario, consumers pay a 
price p equal to the world market price. Producers, on the other hand, receive a higher price (1 +  r)p, 
with r  =  0.4. The scenario consists in assessing how the endogenous variables react when r  decreases 
to 0, when deficiency payments are eliminated as well. If only a partial compensation scheme was 
implemented in the second scenario (’’second bis” scenario), the third scenario consists in going from 
this partial compensation situation to a fully liberalized situation (it is referred to as the ’’third bis” 
scenario ).
23 On a strictly accounting point o f view, this 40 %  production subsidy leads to an over-compensation o f  fanners for the losse 
o f the 40 % excess sale price they used to get. However, on a political point o f  view, these two instruments can be considered to 
be equivalent. In any cases, values given to policy instruments should be put into persective, since the goal o f  the analysis is more 
to give qualitative results in terms o f direction of the changes rather than purely quantitative results.
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2.5.4 Summary of the scenarios
The agricultural policies studied in the model can be summarized in the following diagram 
(pw stands for the world price of the agricultural product, or its market clearing price):
Full liberalization scenarios are the first and the third ones, since they allow the economy to 
go from a regulated situation to a totally liberalized one. On the contrary, the second scenario only 
represents either a change in the regulation instrument, or a partial liberalization (in the case o f the 
"second bis”scenario). The scheme summarizes the policies actually implemented in the CAP reforms: 
A decrease (or elimination) of the price support, its replacement by other instruments (deficiency 
payments) assumed to be less distortionary, and the implementation of support specifically targeted to 
some farmers (direct payments).
The reaction of the endogenous variables to these scenarios are presented in the next section.
2.6 Results of the model
The results are presented as the percentage change in the endogenous variables when going
from the initial to the final situations o f a scenario. Only steady state situations are compared. Indeed,
when the agricultural policy changes, the model shows that the endogenous variables jump from one
steady state to another, without following any transition path. This behavior of the variables is explained
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simple functional forms chosen (logarithmic utility functions and Cobb-Douglas production functions) 
and by the fact that the model does not take into account any expectation behavior, therefore agents are 
always surprised by changes in agricultural policy.
Changes in production variables are presented in the next paragraph, and they are followed by the 
presentation of changes in welfare variables. A ranking of liberalization policies and a summary o f the 
results follow. Appendix B presents quantitative results synthetically.
2.6.1 Results regarding production variables
Many results are common to the first, third and third bis scenarios, meaning that, no matter 
the form the agricultural liberalization takes, no matter the definition o f an agricultural household 
retained, there are some constant consequences o f agricultural liberalization:
- The use o f labor decreases in the agricultural sector, while it symmetrically increases in the 
non-agricultural sector. If the share o f labor force used in the agricultural sector before liberalization 
represented slightly more than 4 %, it reaches a level of slightly less than 1 % in the complete 
liberalization case (first and third scenarios). This represents a decrease o f 81 % in the agricultural 
workers’ population, and an increase of 3.7 % of the non-agricultural workers’ population. Whatever 
the form of the agricultural support (price support or deficiency payments), this evolution is the same. 
And, logically, the stronger the liberalization, the larger the decrease in the share of labor used in the 
agricultural sector (in the second bis scenario, a 40 % price support is replaced by a 20 % production 
subsidy, and the labor used in the agricultural sector decreases by ’’only” 54 %).
- The non-agricultural production increases, while the agricultural one decreases; they both 
follow the evolution of labor used in each sector. Indeed, since the capital/labor ratio in each sector 
stays constant (because these two inputs are mobile), the capital used in each sector follows the same 
evolution as the labor used in each sector, and hence the production levels.
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- The quantity o f capital in the economy increases, by 0.8 % in the full liberalization cases, and 
slightly less in the partial liberalization cases* It shows the positive impact of agricultural liberalization 
policy on the whole economy.
- The nominal remuneration of labor and capital stays constant: Since these inputs are mobile 
between the two sectors, their remunerations cannot be affected by agricultural policy, since they have 
to be always equal to the marginal productivity of the inputs in the non-agricultural sector, which is not 
affected by agricultural policy.
- The land remuneration decreases by up to 81 % of its initial level when the agricultural sector 
is folly liberalized. It is not affected by change in agricultural policy instrument, from price support to 
deficiency payments, since global support level stays constant. Logically, the stronger the liberalization, 
the larger the decrease in land remuneration. This result conforms with the literature on the topic: ’’Since 
land is in fixed supply, the result (of a protected agricultural sector) has been a steady inflation in land 
values and rents.[...] By removing, or, at least, scaling down price support, it might be expected that this 
trend would go into reverse” (Potter and Goodwin, 1998, p.289).
- In all liberalization scenarios, agricultural surplus and net taxes logically decrease. The 
agricultural surplus also decreases when price support scheme is replaced by deficiency payments 
(second scenario): It is then due to the fact that agricultural production stays constant (because the price 
received by producers stays the same) while demand increases since consumer price decreases.
We now turn to the evolution of the variables directly affecting the welfare o f the agents, namely 
the permanent consumption levels.
2.6.2 Results regarding welfare variables
Comparison of outcomes o f the model for different scenarios give results for the society as a 
whole, but also for each agent, depending on the definition of the agents. They are reviewed successively.
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2.6.2.1 Evolution of the whole society welfare
The global outcome of the reforms consists in an increase o f the whole society permanent 
consumption in all scenarios (excepted in the third bis one), from 0.11 % in the third scenario to 1.13 % 
in the first scenario. In any definition of the agents, the evolution of the permanent consumption levels o f 
both agents’ group follows the same directions: The farmers’ group loses some permanent consumption 
in all the liberalization scenarios (first, second bis, third and third bis), and gains in the second scenario 
when price support is replaced by deficiency payments. On the other hand, the non-farmers’ group gains 
in all the scenarios, whatever is the definition o f the agents retained. In the full liberalization scenarios 
(first and third ones), gains of non-farmers are sufficient to compensate farmers for their losses, so that 
global welfare increases. It also increases in the second scenario, meaning that deficiency payments are 
preferred to price support scheme by the whole society (they are actually preferred by each agent as 
well). The global welfare decreases in the third bis scenario because the non-farmers’ gains are so small 
that they cannot compensate for the losses o f the farmers, despite the small number o f farmers in the 
society.
These results are only global results regarding the society as a whole. They assume that the 
distribution of welfare changes between the two agents is not valued in itself, and that redistribution 
schemes aiming at compensating for the losers of the policy would be implemented. However, it 
is realistic to assume that these compensation schemes are not always fully and / or successfully 
implemented. Distribution of welfare changes between the agents is then important, since, with 
incomplete compensation, the losers would have incentives to try to block the reforms. The next section 
presents the distribution of welfare changes between the two agents.
2.6.2.2 Decomposition of the welfare evolution between the agents
When examining welfare evolution between the two agents, the definition given to each agent 
is important. However, the model shows that, when looking at each whole group (the farmers’ group,
71
!•
*
j;
4
:i
\
the non-farmers’ group), the different definitions o f the agents only have an impact on the magnitude of 
the changes, not on their direction. On the contrary, when looking at the per capita results (per fanner, 
per non-farmer), differences arise in the direction o f the changes as well. For instance, when a fanner 
is realistically defined as someone who owns the land and can allocate his labor in both sectors, the 
farmers* group suffer less from liberalization than when he is defined as someone working exclusively in 
the farm sector: When price support scheme is eliminated (first scenario), the land owners* group would 
lose 23 % o f  its initial permanent consumption, while the agricultural sector workers would lose 81 % 
o f it. At the same time, the non-farmer group benefits less from liberalization policies: Still in the first 
scenario, the non-land-owners* group would gain 2.6 % o f their initial consumption versus 6.4 % for the 
non-agricultural workers. This divergence in the magnitude of the results is due to the fact that, when a 
farmer is defined as someone working exclusively in the agricultural sector, the permanent consumption 
o f the farmers’ group is affected not only through the remuneration o f land (q, as in the other definition 
o f the farmer) but through some quantities as well (through L\,  contrary to the other definition).
As for per capita results, they depend dramatically on the definition of the agents, even for the 
direction o f their changes: When the fanner can allocate his labor in both sectors but still remains a 
fanner because he owns the land, liberalization policy does not change the number of farmers in the 
society in the short run. Hence, since permanent consumption o f the whole group decreases, per capita 
permanent consumption decreases by the same amount. On the contrary, when the number of farmers 
decreases with agricultural liberalization (because a farmer is someone who works exclusively in the 
agricultural sector), then the per capita permanent consumption slightly increases (because permanent 
consumption o f the whole group decreases less than the number o f persons working in the agricultural 
sector). Hence, if  the fanner is defined as someone allocating all his labor to the agricultural sector, 
his per capita permanent consumption increases when the sector is liberalized (by 1.84 % in the first 
scenario, and by 0.99 % in the third one). However, if  the fanner is defined more realistically as 
someone allocating only a share of his labor to the agricultural sector, liberalization leads to a decrease 
o f his per capita permanent consumption (-23 %),
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Despite these divergences, some global conclusions can be drawn on the relative advantages of 
agricultural instruments and on the best sequencing of reforms.
2.6.23  Ranking of the policies
For both agents (and for whatever definition of them), it is better to implement deficiency 
payments instead o f price support if  the agricultural support has to be maintained (the second scenario 
increases the welfare of both agents). This is due to the fact that deficiency payments generate less 
agricultural surplus than price support. Hence, even though the taxes needed to fund deficiency 
payments are equivalent to the previous excess in price paid by consumers, the agents do not have to 
pay for export subsidies (or stock management) in the deficiency payments situation.
However, in a longer-term perspective, the agricultural support would have to be eventually 
eliminated. It is then better to liberalize directly from a price support situation than from a deficiency 
payments one (the global permanent consumption increases by 1.13 % in the first scenario and by 
only 0.11 % in the third scenario). This is due to the fact that the elimination of deficiency payments 
(represented by the third scenario) logically has some negative effects on the fanners’ group permanent 
consumption (it decreases between 24 and 81 %, according to who is regarded as a farmer), which 
are hardly compensated for by the very small gains of the non-farmers (their permanent consumption 
increases between 1.5 and 5.1 %). On the contrary, when the price support scheme is eliminated, the 
losses of the farmers are almost the same, while the gains of the non-farmers are larger, therefore the 
whole society gains are larger. Hence, on an economic point of view, a one-step liberalization process 
should be preferred to any other transitional policy, and the agricultural price support should be directly 
eliminated. However, the choice between the two agricultural policy instruments (price support or 
deficiency payments) and between a one-step or a two-step liberalization program may be as political as 
economic, and the conclusions of the model may have to be moderated
Nevertheless, since liberalization policies are assumed to be unanticipated in the model, a 
two-step liberalization scheme (price support replaced by deficiency payments, which are afterwards
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eliminated) eventually leads to the same results as a one-step liberalization scheme (elimination of the 
price support). For instance, the whole society permanent consumption increases by 1.13 % in the first 
scenario. This is roughly equivalent to the sum of the changes in the second and third scenarios (1.01 
and 0.11). Therefore, the differences between the two policies (or the two instruments) depend very 
much on the time passed between the two steps of the policy: The shorter the time-period, the more 
similar the two policies.
2.63  Summary of the results
Whatever form the full liberalization of the agricultural sector takes, and whatever definition 
o f an agricultural household is retained, liberalization o f the agricultural sector eventually leads to 
an increase in the whole society permanent consumption. Permanent consumption increases for the 
non-farmers, either for their whole group or for each of them, in all the studied scenarios. Permanent 
consumption decreases for the whole farmers’ group in all the liberalization scenarios. However, the 
evolution o f the permanent consumption per farmer depends on who is regarded as a fanner. If, as it 
may be more realistic to assume, a farmer can allocate his labor in both sectors, then the agricultural 
liberalization decreases the permanent consumption per fanner. On the contrary, i f  a fanner is someone 
who allocates all his labor to the agricultural sector only, then its liberalization increases the per fanner 
permanent consumption.
If complete agricultural liberalization is not implemented in one step, it has been shown that, 
whatever definition of an agricultural household is retained, fully replacing price support scheme by 
deficiency payments increases the whole society permanent consumption, as well as the permanent 
consumption o f each agent. This means that if, for political reasons, the agricultural sector support has 
to be maintained for some time, it seems better to implement deficiency payments instead o f keeping 
a price support scheme. However, considering that the agricultural sector has eventually to be fully 
liberalized, it is better, for the whole society and for each agent, to liberalize directly from the price
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support scheme instead o f implementing some transitory deficiency payments whose elimination would 
eventually have consequences as dramatic as the elimination o f the price support scheme. Nevertheless, 
while eliminating price support scheme, a redistribution scheme should be implemented in order 
to compensate the farmers for their losses. Indeed, considering that the European reality is better 
represented by farmers also working off-farm, the model concludes that fanners would lose from any 
liberalization scenario. Given the small number of farmers in the European society and the large gains 
the liberalization of the agricultural sector give to non-farmers, this redistributive scheme could be quite 
easily implemented, at least from an economic point of view (the political aspect of the problem may be 
an issue, however). This redistribution scheme would take the form of direct payments provided to the 
farmers such that the welfare of both kinds of agents increases. Logically, direct payments (net transfers) 
are more efficient than market price support or deficiency payments, since they are less distorting and 
can be better targeted.
The fact that the results of the model differ in magnitude and directions in the two definitions o f the 
agents should draw attention to the evolution of the farmers' group in the European Union. According 
to the way a fanner is defined (working exclusively on farm or owning the land), different agricultural 
policies might be preferred to reach different objectives. Hence, before choosing an agricultural policy, 
the targeted population has to be clearly identified: Only the full-time fanners, usually richer and 
exploiting larger farms; or also the persons working part-time on a farm, with a risk o f transforming 
a sectorial policy into a social policy. In addition to the necessity of a clear definition of the targeted 
population, another way the CAP needs to evolve is in the definition o f new objectives, such as clearly 
focusing on environment protection. Indeed, it has been shown that agricultural policy has a dramatic 
influence on land price, and hence on its use.
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2.7 Conclusion
The model developed in this chapter has shown that the fanners’s welfare, assessed on 
an intertemporal basis, decreases dramatically when agricultural support measures are eliminated. 
Therefore, this model, which takes investment into account, reaches conclusions close to the ones 
o f  many other models which do not display any dynamic features, giving more strength to these 
conclusions. It shows that the negative impact of agricultural liberalization on fanners lasts over time. It 
can be because the initial effect is very large, so that it is transmitted to the following periods, or because 
the negative effect is spread over several periods. Since the variables jump from one steady state to 
another, the first explanation seems more likely. A more complex model (which would take into account 
uncertainty for instance) would permit to better explain this feature, although it would also make more 
difficult to clearly establish the impact o f  policies on variables.
The main conclusion reached by this model is that fanners should be compensated for the losses 
they suffer during agricultural liberalization, since they lose a significant part o f their permanent 
consumption. The issue of the level, the duration and the form this compensation should take is salient: 
It has been shown that deficiency payments should be implemented only if the compensation is expected 
to last for a long time (however, a more precise model would be needed to identify how long is ”a 
long time”). Otherwise, direct payments, taking the form of net transfers to fanners (ideally according 
to their wealth level or to some other objectives of environment protection for instance), should be 
preferred. In the CAP reforms framework, deficiency payments are implemented with no explicit time 
limit. They should therefore be replaced by direct payments, or their duration should be clearly ended.
All the results o f the model have to be put into perspective by its limits. One of those regards the 
fact that distortions are not taken into account in the implementation of the policies, and particularly 
when collecting taxes. However, these distortions would be equivalent for all instruments, and hence 
this limit o f  the model does not change the relative value of each instrument: Direct payments should 
always be preferred to any other agricultural instrument.
76
Many conclusions reached in this chapter change dramatically with the definition given to the 
agents, and particularly the conclusions relative to the distribution of welfare changes between the 
agents. Since the definition of the agents represents the evolution of the European population, the model 
shows that the European agricultural policy may have to change its goals, according to whom it is really 
targeted.
Although it now seems obvious that fanners in industrialized countries should no longer 
receive subsidies for purely historical or political reasons, this model has shown that they should be 
compensated for their losses when their sector is liberalized. This compensation is possible because 
the whole society gains from agricultural liberalization. It is therefore desirable to liberalize the 
agricultural sector, from both an internal and an external point o f view. On the internal side, because the 
European agricultural sector has evolved a lot during the last two decades, and the former CAP is no 
longer adapted. On an external point of view, because, inter alia, European agricultural support (as the 
support by any other industrialized countries) may have negative effects on world markets, impeding 
some developing countries from expanding their agricultural sector. The effects of agricultural sector 
liberalization in developing countries is studied in the next chapter.
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APPENDIX A Resolution of the model
From 2.48 in steady state:
r = p + 6 + h A.59
From 2.56 in steady state:
A.60
From 2.23,2.24,2.27,2.28,2.57,2.58 and A.60:
k
1 a  (1 - /3 )  \ p  + 6 + h J A.61
From 2.33:
— k  
k 2 — ki
A.62
From A.60, A.61 and A.62:
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From 2.32 and A.63:
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From 2.38, A.61 and A.63:
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Solving the non-agricultural market clearing equation 2.55 in steady state for using
A.65 gives:
IP
- n x 2 -t e )  ^1 i4> + A ”  (1 “  n) {<x& + l& — cc)
a (p + 6 + h)
+ 6 + h.
(  y - J  i * -
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From 2.22,2.41,2.46,2.50, A.63 and A.61:
y \
T
( (  1 - 0  y  (8\ i -
\ + \  - (p + s + h ) t  V -fl“* ' (1 + T ) , p-----nx in
A.67
The next steps o f  the resolution of the model are done using the values o f the parameters, in order 
to make the substitutions easier. The route followed consists in equalizing the two previous expressions 
of ( j  + , using the trade balance equation (2.3). It gives nx i as a function of the parameters and the
policy instruments. From the trade balance equation (2.3), we get 71x2. From the government budget 
constraint (2.4), we get the value of the net transfers as a function of the world price pw and of the 
policy instruments p  and r :
nt -  (pw -  p) nxi -  Tj/i A .68
The market clearing price is such that x \  =  0 for r  =  0. The value o f T is fixed such that the ratio 
of the two production levels is realistic. We then get values for all the endogenous variables.
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APPENDIX B Change in variables
scenarios J5t 2nd 2nd bis y d~ 3rd bis
A la -81.4 0 -53.8 -81.4 -59.9
A  L2 3.7 0 2.4 3.7 1.2
A  k 0.8 0 0.5 0.8 0.3
-81.4 0 -53.7 -81.4 -59.8
Ape 1.13 1.01 1.05 0.11 -0.09
When the fanners are the persons working in the agncultural sector
scenarios 2n<r 2nd bis r 3 3rd bis
ApCji -81.1 0.85 -53 -81.25 -59.74
APCNA 6.37 1.19 4.68 5.12 1.61
ApCj4 percoli 1.84 0.84 1.56 0.99 0.28
2.57 1,19 2.18 i 1.37 0.38
When the fanners are the persons owning the land (changes for each group or for each individual
are the same):
scenarios 2ndr 2nd bis" 3rd 3rd bis '
A  pcA -22.97 0.83 -14.87 -23.61 -9.57
A pCtfA 2.57 1.02 2.18 1.53 0.38
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Chapter 3
A model o f agricultural liberalization in a developing country
3.1 Introduction
Less developed countries are strongly affected by agricultural liberalization measures 
currently implemented all over the world. In fact, the agricultural sector in developing countries has 
traditionally been highly regulated. Therefore, liberalization measures induced by structural adjustment 
programs have a strong impact on the structure o f the sector. Moreover, the agricultural sector in 
developing countries employs a large share of the labor force and contributes to a large part of GDP. 
Consequently, any change in agricultural policy is veiy likely to lead to dramatic economic and social 
consequences.
Traditionally, agricultural policy in the majority of developing countries has consisted in taxing 
the agricultural sector, either directly (taxes on production or on exports) or indirectly (with a price fixed 
by the government at a level lower than the market one). Although the literature about the consequences 
of agricultural liberalization leads to diverse conclusions, almost no country can now afford not 
implementing the liberalization measures recommended by international institutions. Therefore, it is 
crucial to assess the welfare consequences o f the agricultural sector liberalization measures and the 
effects of different policies on the livelihood o f the rural poor and of the rest o f the society.
Most o f the models that already exist on this topic are computable general equilibrium models and 
sectorial partial equilibrium models24. Computable general equilibrium models require a lot of data, 
and hence are usually applied to large developing countries. In fact, in large countries, data are more 
easily available and time-consuming modelling is worth doing since domestic agricultural policy has
24For multi-country general equilibrium models, c f  Scandizzo 1992 (static model) or Harrison and al. 1995, Francois and al. 
1994 or Goldin and al. 1993 (dynamic models). For one-country general equilibrium models, c f  De Janvry and Sadoulet (in 
Goldin and Knudsen, 1990). Warr (1997) and Anderson (1998). For partial equilibrium models, c f  Bale and Lutz 1981 (static 
model o f one country), Anderson and Tyers 1991 and 1993 (static models o f  several countries), Chauveau and Gordon 1988 or 
Zwart and Blandford 1989 (dynamic models).
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an impact on the whole region. Regarding partial equilibrium models, they are badly adapted to the 
study o f less developed countries, where the agricultural sector represents a large part of the economy, 
and where the agricultural policy has an impact on the whole economy. In fact, De Janvry et al. (1992, 
p.430) argue that the use of general equilibrium model when studying agricultural liberalization in 
developing countries is justified by the fact that the changes in the prices of the agricultural products are 
’’sufficiently large that they can be expected to have significant macroeconomic effects and hence affect 
all the other prices in the economy”. Moreover, they argue that, in the developing countries’ case, policy 
modelling finds its ’’usefulness in the systematic lack o f  comparable data over time that would allow to 
separate ex-post the impact o f policy instruments. For this reason, recourse is made to simulation of 
policy impacts in such models, either to retrace historical effects in duly calibrated models or to explore 
alternative scenarios” (De Janvry et al. 1992, p.447).
For these reasons, the analysis developed in this chapter presents a general equilibrium model 
which assesses the impact on income distribution of the removal o f different agricultural instruments. 
However, our analysis is different from the already existing ones because it emphasizes the importance 
of the definition given to the agents (by considering fanners’ off-farm labor and landless agricultural 
workers), and it takes into account the fact that some agricultural production is not marketed but 
is home-consumed (the agricultural policy then has no direct impact on this kind o f production). 
Moreover, our analysis introduces some dynamical features through investment variables. However, 
the model developed in this chapter remains simple because it is not applied to a specific country but 
to a theoretical representative country. An agricultural household model is first presented by itself, in 
order to understand the links between marketed and non-marketed agricultural production, referred 
to as ’’cash crop” versus ’’food crop”: Marketed agricultural production brings some cash to farmers, 
while non-marketed agricultural production is used by farmers for family food consumption only. 
This agricultural household model is then integrated into a general equilibrium model representing the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. We then get a three-sector general equilibrium model, since 
the agricultural production is divided between food crop and cash crop.
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The main results of the model show that agricultural liberalization is positive for the global welfare 
o f  the society, although some groups, both urban and rural, suffer from it. Moreover, agricultural 
liberalization changes the productive structures o f the economy, and should hence be undertaken 
progressively and cautiously.
The remaining o f the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the evolution o f the status 
o f the farmers (with the development o f off-farm work) and the evolution o f agricultural policies in 
some developing countries. A modeled analysis o f liberalization measures is then presented: Section 
3 presents the agricultural household model, while the general equilibrium model and its results are 
described in section 4. Conclusion follows in section 5, and the appendixes present the details of the 
models.
3.2 Evolution of the agricultural sector in some developing countries
3.2.1 Choice of some "representative” developing countries
The models studied in this chapter develop an analysis applied to a ’’representative” country. 
This simplification aims at drawing conclusions on the economic impact o f agricultural policies, without 
taking into account the social and historical context in which they take place. The ’’representative 
country” analysis allows a focus on the economic side o f the reforms. However, to give more reality 
to the type o f economy studied, let us think o f it as a small country, among the poorest in the world, 
where agriculture accounts for a very large part o f the economy. For instance, Laos or Cambodia in 
South East Asia, and Tanzania or Uganda in South Saharan Africa would enter into this category. In 
fact, their GDP per capita was between 260 (Cambodia) and 310 USD (Uganda) in 200125. Poverty26 
hits around 40 % of the population, and it is much higher in rural areas (87 % of the Laotian poor live
25 World Bank Development Report, 2002.
26 Poverty is defined as a level o f income 50 % lower than the median adjusted disposable personal income.
*in rural areas, and 99 % of the rural poor live in farm households27). In these countries, agriculture 
contributes to around 50 % o f  GDP and employs around 80 % o f labor force. The table below presents 
some economic indicators for countries which enter into the category we are interested in (data are for 
2001; source: World Bank, 2002):
HDI rank 
(out of 174)
GDP per 
capita ($)
% agriculture 
in GDP
% male labor force 
in agriculture
% rural 
population
Laos 140 290 53 77 78
Cambodia 137 260 51 71 78
Tanzania 156 280 46 80 74
Uganda 158 310 45 84 87
HDI stands for Human Development Index, while PPP stands fo r Purchasing Power parity.
In this kind of countries, the agricultural sector is made of domestically marketed crops and of 
one or two main export crops. For example, in Laos and Cambodia, this export crop mainly consists 
in wood; in Tanzania, of cotton and coffee; in Uganda, o f coffee. Even the domestically marketed 
production is often very little diversified.
3.2.2 Evolution of the farm  sector
In developing countries, one o f the main changing features of the farm sector in the recent 
years has been the rise of off-farm activities. It has led to an evolution of the inequalities between 
farmers and non-farmers, and to changes in the impact o f  agricultural policies.
3.2.2.1 Development of ofT-farm activities
More and more fanners have off-farm activities, leading to an important share o f non-farm 
income in rural income. For instance, Reardon and al.(2000) report an average share o f 42 % of non-farm 
income in total rural household income in Africa, 40 % in Latin America and 32 % in Asia. Moreover,
27 World Bank country report, 2000.
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since ”non-farm activities are monetized to a much larger extent than is agricultural production, 
non-faim earnings constitute an even larger share o f cash income” (Hagblade and al., 1989, p. 1177).
3.2.2.2 Reasons for the development of off-farm activities
Malchow-Moller and Svarer (2001) summarize the reasons for an agricultural household to 
allocate labor to the non-farm sector. It can be a response to:
- Imperfect input markets (land and capital): ”If households are restricted in their access to 
land and capital, i.e. i f  markets cannot be used to freely adjust inputs in accordance with economic 
incentives, households with small endowment o f  land and capital must seek employment off the farm” 
(Malchow-Moller and Svarer, 2001, p.5);
- Imperfect credit market, which prevents the purchase o f inputs. In this case, off-faim labor can 
provide both the needed income and the liquidity to buy farm inputs. A negative relationship between 
land and off-farm labor might then emerge, since land is usually used as collateral;
- Uncertainty o f agricultural income which causes households to diversify income ex-ante and 
react to negative shocks ex-post by participating in off-faim activities. Off-farm labor is then used as a 
means of managing farm-income risk.
Imperfect markets and uncertainty features are not integrated in our models, in order to simplify 
the results and to focus on the direct links between agricultural policy and welfare. However, the 
development o f off-farm work, which is an important stylized fact of the recent years in developing 
countries, is represented in the models developed in this chapter. Therefore, the important simplification 
consists in not taking into account the reasons for the development of off-farm labor, but in taking this 
new form of labor into account, as the difference between total labor time of the household and labor 
time actually used in the farm.
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3.2.23 Non-farm activities and income distribution
The impact of non-farm income on wealth inequality is not clear. Indeed, it exists evidence 
o f ”non-unifoim effects of non-farm income on rural income inequality (and of) a U-curve relationship, 
where the share (of non-farm income) is relatively high for small farms and the poorest households, 
declines in the middle income and / or landholding range and then rises at the higher end of landholding 
and incomes” (Reardon and al., 2000, p.272). This idea o f a U-curve is explained, inter alia, by Wiggins 
and al. (2001); They remark that there exists a ”dual nature of diversification: For the poor, taking on 
additional petty activities was a way to escape extreme poverty and destitution” (Wiggins and al., 2001, 
p .l 1). On the contrary, ’’the better-off were able to depend on one or two sources for the bulk o f their 
income. [...] Diversification was thus not necessarily something pursued or valued in itself. It was a 
by-product o f  the struggle for decent livelihoods for households that lacked the education or capital 
to enter better-rewarded activities” (Wiggins and al., 2000, p.20). This view is confirmed in another 
empirical study by Malchow-Moller and Svarer (2001): They find that ’’agricultural off-farm work is 
negatively correlated with marketed share. That is, individuals from households that market a larger 
share of their crops participate less in off-farm work. It indicates that off-farm work is traded-off against 
cash crop production as a means of generating liquidity” (Malchow-Moller and Svarer, 2001,p.l 9).
Our analysis focuses on very poor and rather egalitarian countries where off-farm labor is very 
likely to be a necessity rather than a choice. We can then consider that our study is located on the 
left-hand side (close to the origin) of the U-curb described earlier.
3.23 A gricultural policies in developing countries
Agricultural policies in developing countries have very often consisted in agricultural 
taxation, either directly or indirectly. The reasons usually invoked for agricultural taxation and its forms 
are presented now.
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3.2*3.1 Reasons invoked for agricultural taxation
Many developing countries tax agriculture, either because it is their direct goal, or because 
it is an indirect way of protecting the manufacturing sector. The main reasons invoked for turning the 
terms of trade against agriculture can be divided into efficiency reasons aiming at enhancing the whole 
economic growth and equity reasons aiming at providing aid to some social groups.
According to efficiency reasons, agricultural taxation aims to:
- Transfer resources to non-agricultural sectors, often supposed to have higher total factor 
productivity growth rate than agriculture; however, all the literature does not agree on this assertion;
- Promote the efficiency of agricultural production: The farms able to survive the negative 
agricultural policy are supposed to be the most efficient ones;
- Easily generate revenues for the government* In fact, the relatively inelastic aggregate 
agricultural supply argues for relatively heavy taxes. However, "agricultural commodities face unstable 
and unpredictable world prices, and taxes on primary commodities are likely to yield revenues that 
fluctuate even more strongly than these commodity prices. Indeed, the government may well feel 
that the farmer should be shielded from the full effect of world market price instability, in which case 
the tax, being the difference between a volatile external price and a less volatile internal price, will 
be more unstable than the international price" (Newbery and Stem, 1987, p.179). This is obviously a 
shortcoming of governments using agricultural taxes as a source o f revenue.
According to equity reasons, agricultural taxation aims to:
- Subsidize low-income consumers. Indeed, agricultural taxation also consists in imposing 
a domestic price of the agricultural product lower than the equilibrium price, for both producers and 
consumers. Cheap agricultural products then act as a food subsidy replacing direct income subsidy 
often difficult to implement in developing countries. It is mainly directed at the poor city-dwellers, since 
they have to buy all the food they consume, which is not the case for the rural poor, who can consume 
a share of their own production. However, it has to be reminded that, in the whole developing world,
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slightly more than 70 % of the poor live in rural areas28. Therefore, an artificially low agricultural price 
is not necessarily the best way to help the larger number o f poor people. Nevertheless, such a policy 
can be mainly explained by the fact that urban poor often have more political power than rural poor in 
developing countries because ’’more spatially concentrated and visible forms of urban poverty are likely 
to generate new pressure on governments to respond” (Ravallion, 2001, p .l). Therefore, although rural 
population is urbanizing very quickly, and, as a consequence, urban poverty is growing as well, rural 
poverty may persist longer than urban one. In this context, imposing cheap agricultural products is not 
always the best way to help the poorest share of the population, at least in little urbanized countries as 
the ones we are referring to,
- Redistribute income inside the agricultural sector, considering that the chief beneficiaries of 
higher agricultural prices are the largest farmers. Therefore, lower agricultural prices are supposed to 
provide more equity among farmers.
However, most o f these reasons are often only an excuse to tax the agricultural sector, in order to 
easily provide income for the government. In fact, since the agricultural sector is the most important one 
in developing countries, taxing it is the easiest way for governments for raising funds, that will be used 
in more or less efficient and equitable ways.
3 .2.3.2 Forms of agricultural taxation
Agricultural taxation can be explicit or implicit. In fact, a large part of the tax burden on 
agricultural producers is due to implicit taxes, mainly through overvalued exchange rates acting as a tax 
on exports, in countries where exports mainly consist of agricultural products. However, our analysis 
focuses on explicit taxes, modeled in terms o f agricultural instruments. Among explicit taxes, only 
production taxes are analyzed; income and wealth taxes are not studied. Indeed, in developing countries, 
direct taxes on agents* wealth are often difficult to implement since the government does not have the 
statistical and operational facilities needed to develop a coherent tax system.
28cf, for instance, Ravallion, 2001, p . l .
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Direct and indirect production taxes are distinguished. We will classify as direct taxes on the 
agricultural sector the marketing taxes, on domestic or foreign trade, paid by the agricultural producers 
when they market their products. When levied on foreign trade, they mainly consist in export taxes. 
When levied on domestic trade, they can be levied by local governments on fanners who bring 
their products to urban markets, either at the point of entry into an administrative province or in an 
organized market center. Therefore, only cash crops marketed through formal channels are subject 
to this marketing tax, and not the whole agricultural production. This makes a big difference in most 
developing countries, where a part of food production is often consumed on the farm or marketed locally 
and informally. This feature justifies our distinction between cash crops and food crops in the models.
Another way of taxing agricultural production more indirectly consists in imposing the use of 
marketing boards for some agricultural products. Marketing boards are public administrations that have 
the monopoly on the purchase of certain goods from farmers and their sale to consumers. Therefore, 
governments set the food prices received by farmers and paid by consumers. The official goal of 
marketing boards is to stabilize domestic prices in order to ensure food security. Concretely, they are 
supposed to accumulate money surpluses when the international price is higher than the fixed domestic 
price, and to redistribute these surpluses when the international price becomes lower than the fixed 
domestic price. But surpluses are often used to other purposes, and, often, almost no money remains to 
farmers when the international price decreases. However, farmers still have to sell all their production 
directly to marketing boards, at low prices. In the majority of developing countries, marketing boards 
represent the main tax burden on the agricultural sector. Since domestic price is set at a level lower than 
the international level, exports have to be taxed (or imports subsidized). Therefore, marketing boards 
are not only a domestic marketing instrument, but they also have foreign trade implications.
In addition to classical drawbacks o f any indirect tax, there is a specific negative effect of 
marketing boards as they exist in many developing countries, which often leads to a vicious circle: 
With artificially low prices for agricultural products, farmers can hardly survive, and many have to
migrate to cities, increasing urban unemployment and poverty. In these developing countries, more than
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half o f urban consumption is made o f food products. So, to avoid demonstrations and riots in cities, 
governments have to artificially maintain the price o f agricultural products at a low level. It is therefore 
very difficult to exit this vicious circle29.
Eliminating marketing boards and the tax on marketed production has been the goal of many 
structural adjustment programs in the recent years. It is the impact o f their elimination on welfare that is 
studied in the remaining of the chapter.
3.2.4 Agricultural liberalization measures and their expected effects on welfare
Within the situation just presented, the main agricultural liberalization measures consist in:
- Eliminating the state take-over of the marketing and distribution system, in which agricultural 
prices were fixed by government at a  level often between 30 and 40 % below international market price, 
leading to an implicit consumption subsidy and production tax. Agricultural prices should reach a level 
higher than previously, and, eventually, the world level;
- Eliminating the tax on agricultural production (usually between 20 and 30 % o f market price). 
These measures would reduce the explicit anti-agricultural bias. Measures affecting the implicit
anti-agricultural bias (acting on the exchange rate for instance) are beyond the scope o f our analysis.
The liberalization scenarios studied in the models are now presented. They are extreme and could 
hardly be implemented in a single step, considering the weight o f the agricultural sector in developing 
countries. However, they are useful to give hints on their respective effects.
3.2.4.1 First scenario: Elimination of marketing boards
The first scenario studied in the models presented in this chapter consists in eliminating the 
marketing boards. Therefore, the domestic price o f the agricultural product increases up to the world 
market price and exports are not taxed anymore (or imports are not subsidized anymore). In the models,
29c f  Cohen, 1997, p .2 1-22, for a deeper development o f  this idea.
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it is assumed that the agricultural price increases by 30 %. In this scenario, there is no direct tax on 
agricultural production.
If the price of the agricultural product increases, there is an income effect affecting both agents, 
that may lead to a decrease in global consumption. Moreover, due to the substitution effect, an increase 
o f the relative consumption of non-agricultural goods compared to agricultural goods is expected. In 
addition to these direct effects, an indirect effect is likely to occur through the level of the net transfers 
received by the agents from the government. In fact, if  the domestic agricultural price increases, net 
exports cannot be taxed any longer, leading to a decrease in government’s revenues. This is likely to 
lead to a decrease in the amount of net transfers going from the government to the agents. Finally, 
there is an additional effect regarding the farmer only, namely the profit effect: When the price of the 
agricultural product increases, fanner’s income increases as well, leading to a more uncertain global 
effect of the measure, overall considering the large number of farmers in the society.
3.2.4.2 Second scenario: Elimination of the production tax
The second scenario studied consists in eliminating the tax on agricultural production, 
considering that there is no marketing boards. The initial tax on agricultural production is assumed 
to be of 23 %, such that the global effect for producers be the same as the removal of marketing 
boards. Indeed, for each agricultural product sold, agricultural producers received a price equal to 
p  (1 +  r ) . When marketing boards are removed, it is assumed that p  increases by 30 %, while the tax 
rate r  remains equal to 0. Therefore, global price p  (1 +  r )  increases by 30 %. In order to be able to 
compare the two scenarios, the global price p (1 +  r )  has to increase by 30 % as well when the tax is 
eliminated. If  the tax rate r  was initially set to 23 % ( r  =  —0.23), the global price p (1 +  r )  increases 
by 30 % when r  becomes equal to 0. In this scenario, the price paid by consumers stays constant.
When the tax is eliminated, there is a direct positive profit effect for farmers, whose profit, and, 
consequently, income, increases. There is also an indirect negative effect for the two agents through a 
likely decrease in the level of net transfers. In fact, since the agricultural sector is no longer taxed, the
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income of the government decreases, and hence the level o f  net transfers received by the agents. This 
decrease in the level of net transfers is larger in this scenario than it was in the first scenario. Indeed, in 
the cunent case, taxes used to applied to the whole agricultural production while they applied only to 
exports in the first scenario.
The tax elimination is therefore likely to be negative for non-farmers, and its effect is uncertain for 
farmers, depending on the relative weight o f  the two effects going in different directions (profit effect 
and net transfers effect).
In short, initial situations o f the two scenarios can be summarized by the two following cases:
- Agricultural producers have to sell their production to marketing boards, where consumers also 
have to buy them. Therefore, producers and consumers face the same price, which is lower than the 
equilibrium one.
- Agricultural producers have to pay a tax on their production, and therefore they receive a price 
lower than the equilibrium price; consumers pay the equilibrium price.
The evolution of the social welfare is studied when liberalization is implemented in these two 
cases. The models in which these scenarios take place are now presented. The household model is first 
studied, and next comes the general equilibrium model is which the household model is integrated.
3.3 The household model
Before presenting the household model developed to fit our concerns, the literature on the 
topic is briefly reviewed.
3.3.1 A brief literature review
In the traditional analysis of demand and supply, two separate sets of economic agents, 
consumers and producers, are defined. However, in developing countries, the main form of economic
98
organization is represented by the agricultural household, where the dichotomy between consumers and 
producers is less appropriate. Indeed, an agricultural household is defined as a household producing 
agricultural goods, for sales on market or for its own consumption. Such a household often consumes 
at least a portion o f the output of its productive activities. Moreover, household's labor is often an 
important input into the production process of the farm. Hence, in the agricultural household, production 
and consumption activities take place within the same economic unit. Individuals make simultaneous 
decisions about production (level o f output, demand for factors, choice of technology) and consumption 
(labor supply and commodity demand). This mixture of the economics of the firm and of the household 
is a characteristic o f the situation o f most families in developing countries.
The literature has shown that, with complete markets, production decisions of the household 
are separable from its consumption decisions in a two-step decision-making process30: First, the 
utility-maximizing household chooses to maximize profit from the form and then maximizes utility 
subject to a standard budget constraint which includes the value o f these profits. This is the reason why 
the agricultural household model is said to display the "separation property”. It means that production 
decisions are independent from the households consumption choices (endowments or preferences) and 
from its labor supply decisions. Production decisions depend only on prices and technology. However, 
the converse is not true, and the recursive character of the household model appears: ’The production 
decisions determine profits, a component of household income, which in turn influence consumption 
and labor supply choices. This one-way relationship is known as the profit effect” (Colman and Young, 
1989, p.158). It "is transmitted through the value of full income associated with profit maximization. In 
particular, if there is a change in the price of the agricultural product, this will lead to adjustments in 
labor usage on the farm and to a change in farm profits. The latter, since farm profit is a component o f 
household income, will in turn induce changes in the level of consumption of home product, purchased 
market good and leisure (and hence the households own labor supply)” (Colman and Young, 1989,
30cf, for instance, Bamum  and Squire, 1979, a and b; Benjamin, 1992; De Janvry and al., 1991 and 1992; Lau and al., 1978; 
Lopez, 1984; Sadoulet and al., 1998; Singh and al., 1985 and 1986; Skoufias, 1994.
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p.161). For the fanner, the profit effect (on the production side) might compensate the income and 
substitution effects (on the consumption side) when the price of the agriculture product increases in case 
of liberalization of the sector. Therefore, farmers’ consumption might increase when the price o f the 
agricultural product increases.
However, in many developing countries, the separation property does not hold, mainly because 
markets are not complete. De Janvry and al. (1991) remark that, ”in general, markets exist, but they 
selectively fail for particular households, making the corresponding commodity a non-tradable for that 
household. [...] Strictly speaking, a market fails when the cost of transaction through market exchange 
creates disutility greater than the utility gain that it produces, with the result that the market is not 
used for transaction.^..] The definition o f market failure is thus not commodity specific but household 
specific” (p. 1401). Indeed, for many households, lack o f infrastructure prevents them from selling a 
part o f their production on a market, and they keep it for their own consumption. For these households, 
there is a market failure for this commodity. In this context o f market failure, separation property breaks 
down because the price of non-traded goods becomes endogenous to the household decision making 
process. Production decisions can then depend on the endowments and preferences o f the household, 
and hence become linked to consumption decisions. Such a situation constitutes one explanation to 
the fact, often highlighted by governments in developing countries, that fanners are not responsive to 
price incentives, therefore reducing the effectiveness o f agricultural policies. Indeed, ’’selective market 
failures for labor and I or food severely constrain peasants abilities to respond to price incentives and 
other external shocks and force them to shift the burden o f  adjustment on the non-traded product (food) 
and factor (labor) which the household controls” (De Janviy and al., 1991, p.1401).
The model developed in this chapter takes into account a missing market for food crop, which 
is consumed only inside the household. The goal is therefore to study the effect o f  agricultural 
liberalization measures on an agricultural household who does not sell all its production.
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33.2 Description of the model
This section presents a farm household producing two kinds of agricultural products: A food 
crop and a cash crop. The food crop is non-tradable, in the sense that there is no market for it. Therefore, 
all the household production of food crop is consumed in the household, and it represents the whole 
consumption of it (there is no food crop bought on the market). Hence, food crop is not directly subject 
to agricultural policy. The farm household also produces a cash crop, which is sold on the market and 
is therefore subject to agricultural policy. Cash crops represent either exports or domestically marketed 
products. All the farm cash crop is sold on the market, and the farm household can also buy some cash 
crops. Finally, the farm household consumes manufactured goods, bought on the market. The farm 
household also invests, and all investments consist in manufactured goods. Several agricultural products 
are included into the general terms ’’cash crops” and ”food crops”. It is assumed that, if the household 
hires some non-family labor for farm activities, this labor has the same productivity as family labor. Last, 
the household is assumed to be a unitary decision maker, meaning that intra-household relationships are 
not studied: Final authority for decision making may be diffused throughout the entire household31.
Let us define:
Cc'- consumption o f cash crop by the farm household;
Cp: consumption of food crop by the farm household;
C2 ’ consumption of manufactured good by the farm household;
E : leisure;
Yc: production of cash crop by the farm household;
Yp\ production of food crop by the farm household.
The farm household has some inputs endowments, in labor (L), in land (T) and in capital (K ). 
The model represents the short run since endowments of labor and land are assumed to be fixed (hence 
migration and demographic growth are not taken into account, but off-farm labor is). On the contrary, the
31 Collective and bargaining models where households are not required to make unitary decisions are described, inter alia, by 
Chiappori (1992 and 1997), Apps and Rees (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998),
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level o f capital is allowed to grow with investment. The three inputs can be used in the household’s cash 
or food crops activities. Labor and capital can also be used in off-farm activities, consisting in working {
in other families’ cash crops or in manufactured goods’ production. Labor and capital then get the same |
remuneration as when they are used in the household’s own cash crop production. The land market is !
assumed to be poorly developed and, therefore, the land owned by the household can only be used in j
f
its own productive activities. In other words, it means that the household allocates its land endowment
between its food and cash crops production until the marginal productivity o f land becomes the same in |
the two activities. Hence, for the household, the land market is missing, and there is no external price
for land entering into the household’ land allocation decisions. The household is price taker for the cash
tt
crop, the manufactured good, labor and capital. The manufactured good is regarded as the numéraire. .
Let us define: i
I
w  : remuneration of labor (exogenous); |
r  : remuneration of capital (exogenous); j
L»c : household’s labor used in cash crop; I
L f : household’s labor used in food crop;
Lo  : household’s labor used in off-farm activities if L o  > 0 and hired labor if  L o  < 0;
K c  : household’s capital used in cash crop;
K f : household’s capital used in food crop;
K o  : household’s.capital used in off-farm activities if  K q >  0 and hired capital if Ko  <  0;
Tc  : household’s land used in cash crop;
T f  : household’s land used in food crop.
The farm household solves the following program:
M ax U{Cf ,Cc ,C2,E)  0-1)
Cf ,Cc ,C2,£
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The arguments of the utility function refer to aggregates, both over household members and over the 
agricultural cycle. Thus, both the distribution rules within the household and the role of seasonality are 
ignored.
The utility maximization program is subject to a cash constraint:
pCc +  C2 + K  +6K < (1 +  t)pYç + &Lo + vKo +  N T  (3.2)
Since the food product is not monetized in any market, its consumption and production do not enter into 
the cash constraint. The household spends money when buying cash crop products and manufactured 
products for its consumption or investment. The household receives money from the sales o f its cash 
crops (taxed at the rate r  <  0), from the remuneration of its inputs used off-farm, and from a possible 
net transfer (NT) from the government. This variable is exogenous to the model. If L q or K o  are 
negative, it means that the household hires some inputs, and therefore needs to remunerate them. 
Remuneration of land, labor and capital used in the household production o f  cash crops does not 
explicitly appear in the cash constraint since it is represented through the value o f the production. And 
neither does the remuneration of the inputs used in food crop production, since this production takes 
place only inside the household structure, and therefore is not monetized.
The utility maximization program is also subject to the following quantities constraints:
T > T c + Tf (3.3)
This constraint means that total household’s endowment of land is used in household’s cash and food 
crops.
L > Le +  Lf ■+■ Z»o ■+• K (3.4)
It means that total household’s endowment of time(L) is used in household’s cash and food crops labor, 
in off-farm labor and in leisure.
K > K c + K f + K0 (3.5)
Household’s endowment of capital is used in household’s cash and food crops and in off-farm activities.
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Yf {Lf ,K f iTf ) > Cf  (3.6)
Since there is no market for food crop, household’s production has to be at least equal to household’s
consumption.
In optimum, all these constraints are strictly binding. An additional constraint requires that all 
quantities are positive and that all inputs used in food crop production are family inputs. Therefore, it 
gives:
L f < L , K F < K t Tf < T
In the comparative analysis o f  different liberalization scenarios, only steady state situations are 
examined, where A '=  0 . Hence, we go on with this value o f K  in the resolution of the model.
Taking into account all the previous constraints, the Lagrangian for this program is:
L  =  U(CFiCc,C 2iE)  +  7T [YF {LF iK FiTF) — CF\ 4* (3.7)
A [(1 + r )p Y c  (L e t  K c * T  ~  TV) +  z? (£  — L F — b e  — £ )  +  r  {K  — K F — K c)\
+A [ N T ~ p C c ~ C 2 - 6 K ]
where A is the shadow price o f capital accumulation and n  is the shadow price of food crop. These 
shadow prices indicate the price that the household would be willing to pay to have the corresponding 
constraint relaxed by one unit. Shadow prices can, therefore, serve as indicators of the internal 
perception o f the severity of the constraint imposed on the farm household. Land and food crop are 
non-tradable commodities, therefore they do not have any exogenous price in the model. However, in 
the decision process of the household, non-tradable commodities have endogenous shadow prices which 
play a similar role to tradeable’s prices. Therefore, any change in market prices has a direct impact on 
household’s behavior, as in a separable model, but it also has an indirect impact through changes in the 
value of the shadow prices.
Simple values are now given to the functions, in order to get algebraic values for the endogenous
variables: Utility function is represented by a logarithmic function, while both production functions are
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represented by Cobb-Douglas functions.
£/(CF,Cc ,C2,i;) = i)lnCF + £lnCc +  <rlDf: +  (1 - ’i - ' £ “ a) hlC2 (3’8)
Yc[Lc, K c ,T c ) =  ( L c f  (Kc f  (Tc)l~°~0 Q-9)
YF(LF, K F,TF) =  (3.10)
No technological change is taken into account by simplification because we are only looking at steady 
state situations.
The model is solved for the 17 following unknowns:
Lp, Lc, Lo^Kf , K c ,K o-> K i I f ,  7b, Yp, Kc> C b, C ^C p , ¿?, A, 
using the 17 following equations:
- normalizations o f the three inputs (equations 33,3 .4  and 3.5);
- two production functions (equations 3.9 and 3.10);
• two market clearing conditions (equations 3.2 and 3.6);
-1 0  first order conditions of the Lagrangian, which are presented below, in the resolution of the 
model.
3.33 Resolution of the model
3.33.1 Algebraic resolution
-
I
SII
£
(3.11)
d L
d C i =  0 - »
c 2 =  A (3.12)
d L  .
Q E  '=  0 &
"1
5II (3.13)
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(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17) 
(3-18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
The step-by-step route to solve this model is presented in the appendixes C and D. The last 
manipulations are quite heavy to handle without numerical values o f  the parameters o f the production 
and utility functions, so they are now assigned some values.
3.33.2 Values of the param eters
V
The values o f the parameters reflect the productive and preferences features of the kind of 
economies studied. They allow to reproduce the global features of the economies, such as the share 
of food crops in total agricultural production for instance. In die literature on developing countries32, 
the share of labor remuneration in the agricultural sector usually represents 60 % of total factor 
remuneration, while the share o f capital represents 15 %, and 25 % remains to die land. Of course, these
32cf, for instance, Ruttan and Hayam i, 1983, p .100 and 144; o r Coxhead and Warr, 1995, p.40-42).
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shares only represent some approximations, but they give an idea o f income distribution between the 
production factors. It is assumed, according to the stylized facts o f  the agricultural sector in developing 
countries, that relatively more capital is used in cash crops compared to food crops. It is also assumed 
that the share o f land in both types of crops is the same. Therefore, the adjustment is done through 
the share o f labor, which has to be higher in food crops than in cash crops. Still according to the 
stylized facts, it is assumed that food and cash crops display the same weight in the agricultural sector. 
Therefore, the productive features of the whole agricultural sector are the average o f the two sub-sectors. 
With these assumptions, we get the following values o f the share o f  the inputs:
Labor Capital Land
Food crops 0.7 0.05 0.25
Cash crops 0.5 0.25 0.25
Whole agricultural sector 0.6 0.15 0.25
As for the utility function, the values o f the parameters are taken from the literature on the topic. 
In particular, De Janviy and al. (1991, p.1410) and Singh and al. (1986, p.125) give some useful 
estimations. Adapted to our model, they give the following decomposition o f the household’s utility 
weights:
Food crops Cash crops Manufactured goods Leisure
0.4 0.25 0.2 0.15
Depreciation rate o f capital is assumed to be 10 % in both crops, and the rate o f preference for the 
present is set to 3 %. We then get the following values o f the parameters:
a 0 7 <P V € a P 6
0.5 0.25 0.7 0.05 0.4 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.1
These parameters are used in the values of the endogenous variables found earlier (cf appendixes 
C and D for their precise values). We can then get quantitative results on the influence of agricultural 
liberalization measures on household’ behavior.
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33.4 Results o f  the model
Effects o f  liberalization measures are analyzed by studying the likely evolution o f the 
endogenous variables when different policies are implemented. Since the model only represents 
one agricultural household, many variables remain exogenous. In order to minimize the sources of 
approximation and keep a view o f the issue as general as possible, as few values as possible are given 
to these exogenous variables. Therefore, a general quantitative assessment of the status of the economy 
before and after liberalization can hardly be obtained in this model. However, the direction and the 
magnitude o f the change of each endogenous variable can be assessed through the value of its partial 
derivative with respect to the agricultural policy instruments, p and r .  These values are reported in the 
appendix E, and the changes in the household’s production and consumption variables are described in 
the next sections.
33.4.1 Changes in production variables
By changes in production variables is meant changes in production levels and in use o f the 
inputs. These changes are the same in the two scenarios, since the global price received by producer 
is the same in the two scenarios, only the instrument used to act on this price changes. Agricultural 
liberalization leads to the development o f cash crops activities. On the contrary, production o f food crop 
decreases. These evolutions have an impact on inputs allocation: Some family labor is shifted from 
off-farm to cash crops, while the amount o f  labor used in food crops activities remains constant. At the 
same time, some land is shifted from food crops towards cash crops. However, the pace of this transfer 
occurs at a decreasing rate while the agricultural liberalization becomes stronger. It means that a lot of 
food crops land becomes cash crops land at the first steps o f liberalization, but if liberalization goes on, 
less and less food crops land is transformed into cash crop land, insuring the permanence of some food 
crop production in the long run. Agricultural liberalization also increases the amount o f capital used in 
cash crops activities.
(
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33.4.2 Changes in consumption variables
The shadow price of food crops increases at the same constant rate in the two scenarios, while 
the price of cash crops increases only in the first scenario. Consequently, the share o f food and cash 
crops in household consumption decreases in the first scenario, when marketing boards are removed, 
because prices o f the two goods increase. In the second scenario, when the production tax is removed, 
only the share o f food crops consumption decreases, while the share of cash crops consumption remains 
constant Indeed, the cash crops’ price stays constant while the food crops’ price increases. In the two 
scenarios, the share o f manufactured goods’ consumption remains constant.
All these statements only regard relative consumption levels o f different goods, and no conclusion 
is done on absolute levels o f consumption. These questions will be better answered in a general 
equilibrium model than in a partial model.
3 3 .4 3  General results on income distribution
Expressions of endogenous variables (cf Appendix D) also show their reaction when other 
exogenous variables (not only agricultural policy instruments) are changed. It is particularly interesting, 
in our case, to examine how they react when household’s endowment changes, in order to draw 
conclusions on income distribution. For instance, it can be noticed that the level of capital owned by the 
household increases with the quantity o f land owned, but decreases with labor endowment. It clearly 
reveals the fact that land is one o f the main wealth factor, while labor is not. It is also o f interest to note 
that the more land endowment a household owns, the more of it is allocated to cash crops and the larger 
the cash crop production is. Obviously, this feature is exactly reverse for food crops. Once again, it 
reveals the fact that land is an indicator o f a household’s wealth, since the richest farm households do 
not produce (or very little) food crops. Finally, it is remarkable that the amount o f labor used off-farm 
decreases with land endowment: The poorest households sell proportionally more labor outside the
109
IW K B BQ fiBO H H
family activities, reinforcing the idea o f landless households selling their labor. All these observations 
confirm what has been shown in the previous description of farm sector in developing countries.
33,5 Conclusion of the household model
This simple model has shown that agricultural liberalization might exacerbate some features 
already existing in the sector, by widening the gap between food and cash crop producers. Indeed, 
food crop sector expands dramatically with agricultural liberalization, leading to more land and labor 
(family labor and hired labor) being used in cash crops sector. Therefore, it is likely to observe increased 
inequalities in the agricultural sector, since the ability to switch from food crops production to cash 
crops production depends to a large extent on inputs endowment: The more capital or skilled labor a 
household owns, the easier it is to grow cash crops instead of food crops.
Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that the conclusions reached with a household model are 
partial because they obviously represent only an isolated agricultural household, without taking into 
account the relationships of the agricultural sector with the whole economy. These relationships can 
only be taken into consideration in a general equilibrium model. Therefore, the following section 
presents a general equilibrium model close to the one presented in the second chapter: A farmer and a 
non-farmer produce and consume in an economy with an agricultural and a non-agricultural sectors. 
However, the agricultural sector is now itself divided into food and cash crops, leading to a three-sector 
/ two-agent general equilibrium model. This new specification permits to better take into account the 
specific features of a developing country, by integrating the agricultural household model just presented 
into a more global model that takes into account the non-agricultural sector of the economy as well.
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3.4 The general equilibrium model
This model is made up o f three sectors, the agricultural cash and food crops sectors and 
the non-agricultural sector There are two representative agents, the fanner and the non-farmer. The 
distinction between farmers and non-farmers arises from the fact that farmers are the owners o f the 
land. Indeed, in the countries we are looking at, there are, traditionally, very few landless farmers. It is 
due either to a traditional collective ownership o f land or to a land reform o f  communist inspiration. 
Therefore, farmers are usually the owners o f the land, and it is assumed that the number o f farmers is 
fixed in the short-run, whatever is the agricultural policy. If the policy becomes more in favor of the 
agricultural sector, less fanners are going to work off-farm and /  or more non-farmers are going to work 
in the agricultural sector. So, if the number of farmers is smaller than the number o f persons employed in 
the farm sector, the difference represents the number o f land-less agricultural workers. On the contrary, 
i f  the number o f farmers is larger than the number o f persons employed in the farm sector, the difference 
represents off-farm labor o f fanners. In the model, there cannot be, at the same time, off-farm labor by 
farmers and landless agricultural workers.
The non-agricultural sector produces the non-agricultural good, which is consumed by the two 
agents. The agricultural sector produces two kinds of goods: A cash crop, sold on a market, and 
consumed by the two agents; and a food crop, consumed by the farmer only, on a inside-household 
basis, meaning that it is not marketed.
3.4.1 Presentation of the model
The model is solved following the social planner program33:
M a x f e~pt (bUA +  (1 -  6) Un a ) dt 
Jo
Ua represents the farmer’s utility.
33The subscripts t are omitted for simplification o f  the presentation.
(3-21)
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Ua  - e  log Cc  + 7J log CF +  (1 - i 7 - e ) l o g C ^  
for Cc  : consumption o f cash crop by the farmer,
CF : consumption o f food crop by the farmer,
C A* consumption of non-agricultural good (2) by the faimeT (A).
Una  represents the non-farmer’s utility.
Una  =  (n + e) logCf™ +  (1 -  v  ~  s) log C £ A
for C y A: consumption o f agricultural products (1) by the non-farmer (NA);
consumption of non-agricultural good (2) by the non-farmer (NA).
Both agents are assumed to dedicate the same share o f their income to agricultural (y + e) and 
non-agricultural goods (1 — — e). The only difference consists in the fact that farmers divide their 
consumption o f agricultural goods between food (rj) and cash crops (¿). For simplicity, leisure is not 
valued, since we are more interested in the evolution of the goods’ consumption.
b represents the farmers’ weight in the social utility function, while (1 — 6) represents the 
non-farmers’ weight. It is assumed that b =  0.5, meaning that the social planner values on an equal 
rate the utility o f  the two representative agents. Indeed, the farmers are more numerous in the society, 
but they are also less represented on a political point o f view. Therefore, the two categories get die same 
weight in the social planner program.
The social planner’s utility maximization program is subject to market clearing conditions:
- For cash crop, the market clearing condition is:
Cc  =  Yc -  C ? A -  N X i  (3.22)
for Yc  : production of agricultural product (cash crop)
A’A'i : net exports of agricultural products.
This constraint means that the agricultural production of cash crops is consumed by the two agents 
or is exported.
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- For food crop» the market clearing condition is:
Cf  = Yf  (3.23)
for Yf  : production o f agricultural product (food crop)
Since food crop is not marketed, the agricultural household production has to equal its own 
consumption.
- For non-agricultural good, the market clearing condition is:
K= Y2 - 6 K -  C {  -  C ? A -  N X 2 (3.24)
for Y2: production of non-agricultural good
N X 2 : net exports of non-agricultural products.
K  : amount of capital (only accumulable asset) in the economy
K= ¿¡f — investment
6  : depreciation rate of capital
This constraint means that the non-agricultural production is consumed by the two agents, is 
exported, and is used for investment.
The model is also made up of:
- Production functions of non-agricultural goods (Vj), cash crops (Yc) and food crops (V>):
Yj = (Z L 2 ), (K 2)'-® (3.25)
for L 2 and K 2 the amounts o f labor and capital used in non-agricultural production.
YC =  (ZLc f  (K e f  (Z T c (3.26) 
for LCt K c  and Tc  the amounts of labor, capital and land used in cash crop agricultural production.
Yf = (Z L Fy  (K F)* ( Z T r ) ' - ’- *  (327)
for L f ,  K f and TF the amounts of labor, capital and land used in food crop agricultural production.
Z represents the technical change embodied into new investments, therefore it is the same in all 
sectors. It is assumed that Z=  ^  =  h.
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As in the industrialized country's case presented in chapter 2, the technological change is assumed 
here to be Harrod-neutral (it is labor and land augmenting) in order to guaranty the existence o f a steady 
state. Because o f this technical change incorporated into investments, the accumulable input has to be 
precisely defined. Indeed, when speaking about capital, it should be though of accumulable input, in 
which skilled labor enters as well. So let us think about "capital” as all accumulable inputs, including 
general capital (able to be used in whatever sector) and skilled labor. And when speaking about ’’labor", 
let us think about unskilled labor and specific capital that can hardly be used in another sector than the 
one in which it is installed. This distinction is important in developing countries because capital is not 
always very mobile and skilled labor is very much valued.
The model also consists in:
- Government budget constraint:
ip ~  Pv,)NX i + tYc  + N T  = 0 (3.28)
The actual policy in the studied economies leads to a domestic price o f agricultural product (p) being 
lower than the world price-(pw). It means that the government taxes net exports (or subsidizes net 
imports). The agricultural policy also consists in taxing the agricultural production o f cash crops at the 
rate r  ( r  < 0). Finally, the government can give some net transfers N T  to the agents (N T  > 0).
- Trade balance:
pN X x  +  N X 2 =  0 (3.29)
- Inputs normalization:
L c  -b Lp  +  ¿2  — T  — 1 (3-30)
K c  +  K p  +  K 2 = K (3.31)
Tf + T c  = T (3.32)
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The Hamiltonian corresponding to this program is:
H  =  e~0  (1 -  6) [fo +  i )  log C iM +  0  -  »J -  c) log C ? A] (3.33)
+ e-‘,‘b [r, log (LFy  (K Ff ( T Ff  " ’' *  + ( 1 -  tj -  c) log < # ]
+e-#be  log ( ( I c )°  ( K e f  ( ?  -  TV) 1' " " ' 5 -  C ? A -  N X ^
+A [ - 6 K  +  ( I - L f - L c )$ ( K - K f - K e f ' *  -  C f  -  C ?A -  N X i )  
for A : shadow price o f  capital accumulation.
No unemployment is assumed in the model. However, some hide unemployment is likely to exist 
in the pre-liberalized situation due to a lower labor productivity in the agricultural sector compared to . 
the non-agricultural one. Off-farm work by farmer represents a solution to this hide unemployment
3.4.2 Resolution of the model
The model is solved for 25 unknowns with 25 equations:
The unknowns are:
- the inputs levels: L c ,  Lf,L2 ,K c ,Kf , AT2, K, 7c, 7>;
- the production levels: Yc, Yf , *2;
- the inputs remunerations: r, to, q;
- the shadow price o f capital accumulation and of food crop: A, tt;
- the consumption levels: C c , CF, C*-, C i A,C ^ A\
- the net exports: N X \ ,  NX?,
- the net transfers: N T.
The equations are:
- the 3 production functions (equations 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27);
- the 3 input normalizations (equations 3.30, 3.31 and 3.32);
- the trade balance (equation 3.29);
- the government budget constraint (equation 3.28);
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- the 3 maiket clearing conditions (equations 3.22,3.23 and 3.24);
- 6 inputs remunerations (3 for labor, 2 for land, 1 for capital: equations 3.51 to 3.56 presented 
below);
- 8 first order conditions o f the Hamiltonian, which are presented next page (equations 3.42 to 
3.44, and 3.46 to 3.50).
3.4.2.1 Normalization
Before solving the model, some normalizations are needed. These normalizations consist in 
dividing all die variables by the technical change Z, so that the model is solved for its steady state, when 
all the variables grow at die same rate.
(3.34)
(3.35)
(3.36)
(3.37)
(3.38)
(3.39)
A  —  A Z L , Tit =  -r-= (3.40)
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N X  i
71X1 =  T F * «22 =
n x 2
LZ
(3*41)
3A.2.2 The first order conditions of the Hamiltonian
dH
ac? =  0 «
an _  n ^  ac^*  — 0 ^
d H
ac =  0 <i=>
qh
a\
cA _ b{ l - y - e )
h a  ( l - & ) ( l - T 7 - e )  
~  A
4 A m Q - M n + ' )
1 be
k , x J2 r t£  C?A «22
k = ' 6 + T L 2 ’ T - ~ k — r
(3.42)
(3.43)
(3.44)
(3.45)
In steady state, £ =  0 and this condition is equivalent to the market clearing condition in the 
non-agricultural sector.
8 H
d K = A&
dH
dLp 0 gives:
an
d L c — 0 gives:
d H
dKF =  0 gives:
d H
d K c =  0 gives:
A ,  , dy2- = P + « + f t - ^
c F  =  b q -
l-Tf-V
A0 (fc2) l -e
C/"* — Of -
C A0(fc2)
1—a—a 
1-0
c F - b r }
A ( i -0 )  (to)-e
— t f
A (1 — 0) (fc2) 
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(3-46)
(3-47)
(3.48)
(3.49)
(3.50)
3.4.23 The first order conditions on the production side
(3.51)
®  =  O +  T) p a  ( k e f (3-52)
(3.53)
r  =  ( l - 0) ( i 2) - 9 (3-54)
( l + T ) p ( l - a - / } ) ( k c f (3.55)
« =  * (1 (3-56)
Capital and labor are mobile between the three production activities, hence their marginal 
productivity after agricultural instruments implementation need to be equal in their three uses. Land can 
be allocated between the two agricultural crops. Hence its remuneration needs to be the same in these 
two uses (for tt: shadow price o f food crops for farmers).
The step-by step route to solve this model is presented in appendix F. The last steps of the solution 
include numerical values of the parameters; otherwise, the analytical values of the variables become 
very heavy to handle. These values of the parameters are presented now.
3.43 Values o f the parameters
In less developed countries, food is almost completely equivalent to agricultural products 
since they get almost no transformation or value added between producers and consumers. The stylized 
facts o f  several less developed economies show that the share o f food in household expenditure is 
around 75 %. Referring to the values used in the household model, this share can be divided between 
45 % for food crops and 30 % for cash crops in the agricultural household case. In the model presented 
here, utility function of poor and rich people is not distinguished. It is justified by the fact that we 
refer to very poor countries, where inequalities are not so salient as they can be in some intermediate
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countries like in Latin America for instance. Leisure is not taken into account in this model because it
does not bring any useful pieces of information to our objective of income distribution focus. Therefore» 
the share of non-agricultural good in a household consumption is set to 25 %. This choice of utility 
parameters fits the choice made in the household model presented earlier.
As previously noted» technical change is assumed to be embodied into new investments» and 
therefore to be the same in all sectors. Its annual growth rate is set to 4 %»and represents an average 
between the last decade growth rates and the targeted growth rates for the forthcoming years (cf World 
Bank country reports) for the 4 countries taken as example o f our representative economy (hence 
h =  0.04). The rate o f preference for the present is set to 3 % for both agents (p =  0.03) and the capital 
depreciation rate to 10 % (5 =  0 .1), as is usually done in the literature.
Stylized facts, as well as econometric studies applied to less developed countries, show the 
following share o f inputs remuneration:
Labor Caipital Land
* skilled unskilled general specific /
Agriculture 0.15 0.45 0.05 0.1 0.25
Other sectors 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 /
source: Ruttanand Hayami (1985, p. 100 and ] 44) and Coxhead and Warr(1995, p.40-42)
Considering our definition of inputs (K represents all accumulable inputs, including skilled labor, 
and L takes into account specific capital as well as unskilled labor), we get:
L K T
Agriculture 0.55 0.2 0.25
O ther sectors 0.6 0.4 0
Indeed:
- the share o f remuneration of L in the agricultural sector is represented by the share of unskilled
labor and specific capital in the agricultural sector: 0.45 +  0.1 =  0.55.
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- the share o f remuneration o f  K  in the agricultural sector is represented by the share of skilled 
labor and ’’general” capital in the agricultural sector 0.15 +  0.05 =  0.2.
- the share o f remuneration o f L  in the non-agricultural sector is represented by the share o f 
unskilled labor and specific capital in the non-agricultural sector 0.5 +  0.1 =  0-6.
- the share o f remuneration o f K  in the non-agricultural sector is represented by the share o f 
skilled labor and ’’general” capital in the non-agricultural sector 0.3 +  0.1 =  0.4.
We then turn back to the values o f parameters given to the cash and food crops production 
functions in the household model. We get:
L K T
Cash crops 0.5 0.25 0.25
Food crops 0.7 0.05 0.25
Whole agricultural sector 0.55 0.2 0.25
Mon-agricultural sectors 0.6 0.4 0
This integration o f the two models keeps the coherence o f the production functions since food 
crop production is more labor-intensive than the whole agricultural sector, while cash crop production is 
more capital-intensive.
Finally, the whole set of parameters o f the model is:
a 0 7 6 <P V £ h 6 P
0.5 0.25 0-7 0.6 0.05 0.45 0.3 0.04 0.1 0.03
Scenarios are then run in the model. Three cases are studied:
Ai p  — 1, r  =  0 
B /p  =  1.3, r  =  -0.23 
O p =  1.3, t =  0
The changes from one case to another correspond to different scenarios of liberalization:
From A to C: First scenario, elimination of marketing boards;
From B to C: Second scenario, elimination o f taxes on agricultural production.
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In any case, the global price received by the fanner (p(l +  r))  increases by 30 %, such that the 
two scenarios be comparable. Quantitative results of the model for these scenarios are now presented.
3.4.4 Results of the model
Results represent relative changes in the values o f the endogenous variables when the 
agricultural policy changes. It has to be kept in mind that the directions o f the changes are more 
important than their values, or, in other words, that qualitative results are more important than 
quantitative ones. Indeed, quantitative results change with the values o f the parameters and with the 
initial conditions imposed to the model. However, the general direction o f the changes does not change 
for a large range of parameters or initial conditions, as has been checked in a sensibility analysis.
We examine the changes in endogenous variables when different liberalization scenarios are 
implemented. We first look at the variables related to the production side o f the economy, and then at 
the variables related to its consumption side. Complete results are presented in appendix G.
3.4.4.1 Changes in production variables
In both liberalization scenarios, agricultural production increases. More precisely, this 
increase is due to a dramatic increase in cash crop production: It increases by 140 % in the first 
scenario, and by 146 % in the second scenario. This rise in cash crop production is so large because 
the liberalization measure is itself large and because the agricultural sector is very important in 
the representative country studied, in terms o f share of GDP and share o f consumption. Cash crop 
production increase is logically explained by the end of farmers’ taxation and by a higher price received 
by the farmer for each agricultural product sold. Cash crop production increases more in the second 
scenario because there is no negative demand effect due to higher consumer price, while this negative 
effect exists in the first scenario.
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Regarding food crop production, it decreases by 5 % in the first scenario and by 20 % in the 
second one. This negative evolution is due to a transfer of agricultural resources towards cash crops, 
which benefit from liberalization. Since cash crop production increases more in the second scenario 
than in the first one, food crop production decreases more in the second scenario.
Non-agricultural production decreases in the two scenarios (between 45 and 50 %). This is 
logically explained by the fact that the anti-agricultural bias used to work as a pro-non-agricultural bias. 
Therefore, with agricultural liberalization, the non-agricultural sector loses its relative protection, and 
consequently declines.
With agricultural liberalization, there is a land transfer from food crop production towards cash 
crop production. The evolution o f labor and capital employed in agriculture and non-agriculture follows 
similar trends as the evolution of their respective production levels: It increases in cash crops, more in 
the second than in the first scenario; it is constant in food crops, and it decreases in the non-agricultural 
sector (by exactly the same amount as the production level). Such an evolution reveals that less and less 
farmers work off-farm, since their labor force now finds employment in their own sector. However, it is 
difficult to say whether the agricultural labor force used in cash crops is used inside each agricultural 
household or if it is employed in the agricultural sector but only in some large farms.
It has to be noticed that this evolution represents only the response o f the economy to domestic 
liberalization policy. At the world level, liberalization is expected to lead to stronger competition, and, 
hence, very likely, to a decrease o f the number of persons employed in the agricultural sector. Therefore, 
domestic and international effects would act in different directions, and our model is too simple to 
tell which of these two effects would be the strongest. Moreover, the domestic evolution described in 
the previous paragraph is only the first step of the changes generated by agricultural liberalization. 
Indeed, since the reforms are expected to be positive for the farmers, and since they represent the 
main share of the population, the population is expected to get richer after the implementation of the 
reforms. Consequently, consumption of non-agricultural goods is expected to increase, since it is
more income-elastic than consumption of agricultural goods. Therefore, labor and capital employed in
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the non-agricultural sector are also expected to increase in a second step o f the process o f economic 
adjustment to the reforms. Unfortunately, the increase in the level of non-agricultural goods consumption 
may also lead to an increase in the amount of imports of these goods, if  the domestic industry is not 
prepared to produce rapidly enough goods. However, all these side effects do not really affect our own 
conclusions which mainly regard the direct impact of inputs reallocation on income distribution.
Regarding the evolution of the rental rates o f inputs when the agricultural sector is liberalized, it 
is noticeable that the rental rates o f labor and capital (to and r) do not change because they correspond 
to mobile inputs. In fact, marginal productivity of these inputs does not change in the non-agricultural 
sector when the agricultural sector is liberalized (or at least their marginal productivity is not directly 
affected by agricultural liberalization). Therefore, the remuneration o f these inputs stays constant as 
well. Since they are mobile, it is the ratio o f the inputs and /  or the remuneration o f land that have to 
change in the agricultural sector. Indeed, the rental rate of land increases by 185 % in the two scenarios.
Let us now turn to the evolution of consumption variables, that reveals more clearly the impact o f 
liberalization on welfare.
3.4.4.2 Changes in consumption variables
Permanent consumption of the agents
Permanent consumption (PC) level is used as a proxy of the welfare level of the agents. It is 
deduced from the budget constraints o f the agents, and hence depends very much on their definition:
For the fanner defined as the land-owner, who remains considered as farmer even if  he works 
off-farm (and referred to as the ”A” agent): Using the cash constraint (in steady state) and the food crop 
market clearing condition, as presented in the household model, it gives:
PC  a =  xCf  + pC c  +  C* (3.57)
PC a — ttYf  +  (1 +  t ) pYc +  ^  {La ~  L c  — Lp) +  r  {Ka — K c  ~  K f ) 4* N T a — $Ka
for tt: shadow price o f the food crop product;
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for L a : quantity o f labor owned by the farmer (land-owner). This quantity is fixed initially. S ince 
farmers are assumed to represent, in the initial situation, 80 % o f labor force, we fix: L a =  0.8 (because 
L has been normalized to 1).
L a — Lc  — Lp  represents off-faim labor of the farmer i f  it is positive or labor o f landless 
agricultural workers hired in a farm if  it is negative.
K a  represents the quantity o f accumulable asset owned by the fanner. It is assumed that the asset 
ownership is distributed between the two representative agents on a fair basis, according to their weight 
in labor force. Hence, we have: K a  — 0.8K. The same assumption is made for the net transfers NT, 
therefore N T  a  — 0 .8iVT.
For the non-farmer, defined as someone who does not own any land (referred to as the ”NA” agent): 
PCn a  =  p C ? A +  C ? A =  w L n a  + ( r - S )  K NA + N T n a  (3.58)
for L n a  ' quantity o f labor owned by die non-farmer, Ln a  — 0 -2 .
K n a  *• quantity o f accumulable asset owned by the non-farmer; K n a  =  0 .2K
N T n a  =  0.2N T
Permanent consumption of non-farmers corresponds to the net remuneration o f the owned inputs 
plus the net transfers.
However, these definitions of the agents according to their land ownership is not unique and 
it is interesting to study the evolution o f the agents’ welfare according to their work sector. Indeed, 
liberalization of the agricultural sector leads to the development o f  commercial agriculture and, 
consequently, to a likely disconnection between land ownership and labor in a farm. Instead of many 
small farmers owning their own land and partly producing for themselves, some large farms are likely 
to develop, owning large surfaces of land and employing many landless workers, previously producing 
for themselves or working off-farm in the non-agricultural sector. Therefore, the welfare o f the whole 
rural population working in the farm sector has to be examined, with no distinction according to land 
ownership. Welfare of landless workers would then be included into the analysis, while the welfare
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of the land-owners working off-farm would be excluded. We get an expression of the permanent 
consumption of the people working in the agricultural sector (referred to as the ” 1” agents):
PC\ =  (1 +  t ) pYc  +  w Yf + N T * L i - 6  (K F +  K c ) (3.59)
Regarding the group working in the non-farm sector, their permanent consumption is represented 
by:
PC2 =  ctL2 +  (r -  6) K 2 + N T  * L 2 (3.60)
The whole society permanent consumption does not depend on these distinctions, and is 
represented by:
P C - { 1  + r)pYc  + itYf +  N T  +  g?L2 +  r K 2 -  6K  (3.61)
When agricultural liberalization measures are implemented in the model, the permanent 
consumption of the farmers group (defined as the persons owning the land, working in or off-farm:
PC a ) increases by 30.5 % in the first scenario, and by 32.7 % in the second scenario. At the same time, 
the permanent consumption of the non-farmers group (PCjva) decreases by 41 % in the first scenario 
and by 39 % in the second'one. Since the number of persons in each group is regarded as constant, the 
per capita permanent consumption levels follow the same patterns as the whole group levels. The whole 
society permanent consumption increases in both scenarios, by 20 % in the first one, and by 22.3 % in 
the second one.
The second scenario is preferred to the first one by both agents, and hence by the whole society. 
Indeed, in the first scenario, the farmers benefit from the liberalization measures as producers, but they 
suffer from them as consumers. On the contrary, in the second scenario, they get the same benefit as 
producers, and there is no negative effect for the consumers. For the non-farmers, they suffer more from 
the liberalization measures in the first scenario than in the second: In the first scenario, the price they 
have to pay for the agricultural good increases, while it remains constant in the second scenario. The 
effect on the whole society is the sum of the effects on the two agents. Since farmers are much more
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numerous than non-farmers, the evolution of their permanent consumption gives the trend o f evolution 
of the global permanent consumption.
The evolution of the per capita permanent consumption o f the group of persons working in th e  
agricultural sector (PCu  including landless workers and excluding off-farm work of land-owners) is  
negative. It decreases by 21.3 % in the first scenario, and by 19.6 % in the second. It reveals the fact th a t  
the number o f persons employed in the agricultural sector increases much more than the income o f  th e  
sector. On the contrary, the per capita permanent consumption o f the persons working in the non-farm  
sector {PC2 ) decreases less than the one of the non-farmers’ group {PCn a )'- It decreases by 27.4 %  o f  
its initial level in the first scenario, and by 26 % in the second scenario. This is due to the decreasing 
number o f persons working in the non-farm sector. From the fact that the welfare per land-owner 
{PCa ) increases while the welfare per agricultural worker {PC\ per capita) decreases, we can deduce 
that the landless agricultural workers become more numerous, or that the global income o f their group  
becomes smaller. The ranking of the scenarios suggests that eliminating marketing boards is particularly 
harmful for landless agricultural workers (cf P C \{L \) /L i  in appendix G), while eliminating the tax o n  
agricultural production is particularly positive for land-owners (c f PC a {La ) in appendix G). Therefore, 
on the whole society point o f  view, it is preferred to eliminate agricultural production tax rather than 
marketing boards. Indeed, the second scenario leads to higher increase in permanent consumption. 
Hence, if  an agricultural policy instrument had to be chosen previously, it would have been better 
to implement marketing boards rather than production tax. Indeed, since the removal o f marketing 
boards leads to a smaller increase of permanent consumption, it means that its implementation was 
not as bad as the production tax was. Moreover, if  the government wants to liberalize the agricultural 
sector progressively, it might be a solution to progressively replace production tax by marketing boards, 
although they should not guaranty prices as low as they were usually in the reality, or as they are in the 
model.
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Other consumption variables
The evolution o f the relative levels o f consumption of each type o f  good by each agent does not 
necessarily follow the evolution of the permanent consumption levels. Indeed, relative consumption 
of food crops by agricultural households decreases by 23 % in both scenarios, since its relative price 
increases. This makes the farm household much more dependant on international price fluctuations. 
Relative consumption levels of agricultural cash crops and non-agricultural goods change in the same 
way for the two agents: Relative consumption of agricultural cash crops decreases by 23 % in the 
first scenario (when its price increases), and it remains constant in the second (when its price remains 
constant as well). Consumption of non-agricultural goods increases by 53 % in the first scenario, and by 
33 % in the second: There is a transfer of consumption from agricultural goods (food and cash crops) 
towards non-agricultural goods.
Agricultural sector liberalization leads to an increase in agricultural products exports. Indeed, they 
follow a trend corresponding to the difference between domestic production and consumption levels: 
Since production increases while consumption decreases, exports of agricultural products increase 
(or imports decrease) in both liberalization scenarios. Agricultural liberalization is hence positive for 
the agricultural trade balance. In the two scenarios, exports increase by the same amount; indeed, 
consumption of agricultural products decreases more in the first scenario than in the second one, but 
production increases less.
As for non-agricultural products imports, they increase in both scenarios. Indeed, the domestic 
consumption o f this product increases, while its domestic production decreases. Imports increase more 
in the first scenario than in the second because domestic consumption increases more while domestic 
production decreases more.
Regarding net transfers from the government to the agents, they decrease in both scenarios.
The removal o f the agricultural sector taxation represents a decrease in the sources of income for the 
government. Net transfers logically decrease more in the second scenario than in the first one. Indeed,
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when marketing boards are removed (first scenario), the government can no longer tax agricultural 
exports. In the second scenario, it is a tax applied to the whole agricultural production that is removed. 
Since this tax is larger than a tax on the exports only, its removal leads to more dramatic consequences 
on government’s budget. However, the decrease in the amount of net transfers distributed to the agents 
is not necessarily as bad as it seems to be. In fact, it is not sure that the government’s income was 
previously used in an equitable and efficient way. Cases o f corruption are very frequent in developing 
countries, and public money is often used for private interests. Therefore, the decrease in the amount of 
taxes levied by government does not necessarily mean that the agents are going to receive less transfers.
3.4.5 Conclusion of the general equilibrium model
The scenarios studied lead to some dramatic changes in the values of the endogenous 
variables. However, it has to be kept in mind that these scenarios are themselves extreme, and unlikely 
to be implemented in one step as they are described here. Therefore, the results of our simulations are 
useful to give hints on the relative consequences o f different policies. According to the main objectives 
chosen, the results show that different policies might be implemented.
The welfare of the agents can be estimated by their permanent consumption level. Since the 
countries we are looking at are very rural and based on the agricultural sector, the global welfare of the 
society increases with the agricultural sector liberalization. Nevertheless, this is a global conclusion and 
agricultural liberalization might be harmful for the poorest part of the population. Indeed, all cash crop 
buyers suffer from agricultural liberalization policy and, paradoxically, they are not all urban, but also 
landless agricultural workers. These landless workers become more numerous while the commercial 
agricultural sector expands. They can be former agricultural food crop producers who did not own 
enough of the inputs necessary to adapt to the new environment (skilled labor, capital, land) and to 
transform their former production into cash crop production. They can also be former off-farm workers
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who can no longer find any job in the non-agricultural sector and become off-household workers in the 
farm sector.
Moreover, regarding many productive variables o f the economy, liberalization results are not 
so obviously positive as they are when looking at the global welfare o f the society. Agricultural 
liberalization logically enhances agricultural variables, such as production, employment and 
remuneration of the agricultural specific input (land). On the contrary, it logically hurts production 
and employment in the non-agricultural sector, since agricultural taxation used to work as subsidies to 
the non-agricultural sector. Agricultural liberalization, by enhancing consumption of non-agricultural 
products, may lead to trade balance problems if  the domestic industry is not prepared to respond to this 
increase in domestic demand, and, consequently, it may increase debt problems.
Because of this balanced assessment of agricultural liberalization consequences, political choices 
have to be clearly identified before choosing an instrument of liberalization. In the context o f the model, 
it means that the two studied agricultural instruments have to be carefully compared. Results of the 
model show that the second scenario (elimination of the production tax) should be preferred if  the 
government prefers to increase more cash crops production, to decrease less non-agricultural production 
and to increase less imports o f non-agricultural goods. It should also be preferred if the welfare of 
the people working in the agricultural sector (independently of any land ownership consideration) is 
regarded as an important variable. On the contrary, the first scenario should be preferred if  the goal is 
to reduce less food crop production. Therefore, depending on the variables regarded as more important 
by the government, one or the other means of taxation (and of liberalization) o f the agricultural sector 
should be chosen. Indeed, marketing boards should be preferred if  the government wants to decrease the 
amount of non-agricultural imports and to increase non-agricultural production (when marketing boards 
are removed, in the first scenario, these variables change dramatically, suggesting that the agricultural 
policy instrument was particularly effective). It can also be noticed that marketing boards are less 
harmful than production tax for cash crop production, since, when they are removed, the cash crop
production increases less than in the second scenario. On the contrary, a tax on agricultural production
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should be preferred if the government wants to increase more food crop production. Therefore, 
depending on the whole economic and social context o f the country, one or another policy should 
have been implemented. Moreover, when liberalizing, one policy could partially replace the other one. 
Indeed, instead of implementing one-step liberalization measures like the ones presented in the model, 
a government can choose partial measures. For instance, according to its priorities, it can decide to 
temporarily and partially replace marketing boards by a production tax, or vice versa.
All these conclusions have to be moderated by examining the limits of the model. The main one 
regards the capital market. It has been assumed in the model that households can rent or hire some 
capital as if  a perfect capital market existed. However, the existence o f such a market is not granted in 
developing countries. And even i f  such a market existed, it could be hardly accessible to all households: 
The more rural a household, the more difficult to reach a capital market or a bank. This assumption of 
the existence o f a perfect capital market therefore appears as a limit o f the models presented in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, this assumption can be justified by two means.
The first one regards the nature of the social relationships in the countries studied. Indeed, even 
if  there is no official capital market working efficiently and easily reachable by many people, some 
unofficial capital markets are likely to exist, inside the enlarged family, or the village. A household 
can hence borrow or lend money inside its social group. Reputation constraints compel borrowers to 
reimburse within the agreed period. In this kinds o f transactions, some shortages could happen, but, at 
least, market for capital is not completely non-existent.
The second justification of the assumption o f  perfect capital market is methodological: A model 
which would take into account an imperfect capital market would be much more complicated than 
the models presented in this chapter. However, considering that our main goal is to give agricultural 
policy recommendations, it is not certain that a more sophisticated model would give a better answer 
to our questions. The trade-off between the elaboration of a more realistic and complicated model and 
the improved answers it could give us is not clear. Therefore, our simple model gives a first range of 
answers to some important questions we were interested in.
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3.5 Conclusion
The last two decades have seen the development o f off-farm labor among rural population in 
many developing countries. It is partly explained by the agricultural sector being highly taxed; such a 
policy restraints the normal development of the agricultural sector, and hence generates an excess rural 
labor force. Working off-farm is a way of using this labor force, in uses probably more productive than 
in the agricultural sector. At the same time, it may enhance agricultural productivity since less labor is 
left in it. Moreover, if  off-farm work permits to bring money to the farm household, it might enhance 
investments favorable to productivity as well. However, off-farm labor can also be seen as the first step 
o f rural migrations towards cities, which governments usually want to prevent.
A lighter tax burden on the agricultural sector might be a way of reducing rural-urban migrations, 
or, primarily, off-farm work. Indeed, agricultural liberalization consisting in taxing less the agricultural 
sector would enhance its commercial part. Consequently, there would be an increase in the share of the 
inputs used in this sector. The farmers, previously partly employed off the farm sector, would become 
more and more ’’true” farmers, in the sense that more and more o f their work time would become 
employed in the farm sector. However, it is difficult to tell whether this labor would be used in the own 
farm of the worker, or in another one, usually larger. What can be concluded is that there would be less 
off-farm sector work, but it might also represent agricultural work outside the farm household, in larger 
commercial farms. This is represented by the rise in the number of landless agricultural workers, whose 
welfare suffers from liberalization. Hence, agricultural liberalization would reduce the risk of too large 
migrations from countryside towards cities, but it might be harmful for rural dwellers with low inputs 
endowments.
Depending on the main goal of the government, different routes of liberalization could be adopted, 
w ith the use o f different instruments stressed. However, agricultural liberalization policy should be 
undertaken carefully, since, in the kind o f countries studied, the agricultural population represents the 
large majority of total population. Therefore, income distribution depends very strongly on agricultural
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policy. The models developed in this chapter have shown that agricultural liberalization is positive for 
the whole society, and seems positive for the overall income distribution, since fanners (land-owners) 
benefit from the relaxation of the agricultural tax burden, while non-farmers suffer from it. Since non- 
fanners are often better-off than farmers, overall income distribution may improve. However, the main 
losers of agricultural liberalization are all the net buyers o f commercial agricultural products, who are 
often the poorest share of the population, either urban or rural. Therefore, some redistributive schemes 
should be implemented in order to compensate the losers of the reforms. However, redistributive policies 
are difficult to implement in developing countries. Hence, agricultural liberalization is likely to hurt the 
most vulnerable part of the society: Poor urban-dwellers, food crop producers, land-less agricultural 
workers, whose number increases.
Agricultural liberalization also leads to some productive negative effects. They regard the negative 
reaction of the non-agricultural sector, which is wonying for the future of the economy. It is explained 
by the fact that the anti-agricultural bias used to work as a pro-non-agricultural bias. Therefore, with 
agricultural liberalization, the non-agricultural sector loses its protection. A one-step liberalization 
policy should therefore be avoided. Or, i f  it is implemented, the non-agricultural sector should be 
temporarily subsidized, which is in complete opposition to the theories sustaining the liberalization 
of the agricultural sector. Therefore, agricultural liberalization should not be undertaken by itself, but 
should be included into a larger reorganization o,f the economy, not necessary going only towards a 
more liberal route.
One of the measures favoring an easier transition to a liberalized agriculture would consist in 
accompanying the insertion of the economy into the world market economy. Indeed, the development 
of cash crops makes the country more vulnerable to international price fluctuations that might emerge 
from liberalization. In order to cope with these fluctuations, the political, social and economic structures 
of the country have to be ready for its larger insertion into the world economy. It means, inter alia, 
developing the infrastructures, and mainly the rural ones, such as credit and input delivery system for
instance. It will not necessarily be improved with higher agricultural prices, and it need significant and
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autonomous institutional and organizational changes. Indeed, price and market reforms will turn out 
to be adequate for boosting agricultural productivity only if infrastructures are reformed as well, since 
output depends a great deal on what happens to rural infrastructure. Another accompanying measure 
would consist in developing the financial and land markets. All the spirit of these accompanying 
measures could be summarized as follows: ”In terms of sequencing o f reforms, there is some general 
agreement that one should [...] initiate measures to promote a competitive private sector long before 
dismantling the public sector. [..,] In order to prevent the conversion of a public monopoly into a private 
monopoly, it is important to strengthen the public regulatory framework before attempts at privatization” 
(Bardhan, 2001, p. 159).
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APPENDIX C Resolution of the household model
The ratio of 3.15 and 3.16 gives:
The ratio o f 3.18 and 3.19 gives:
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C.63 in 3.18 gives:
C.62 in 3.15 gives:
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Family labor is allocated between cash and food crops such that it has the same marginal
productivity in both activities. Therefore we have (from 3.15 and 3.18):
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Using C.62 and C.63 in the two parts of C.67, it gives:
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APPENDIX D Values of the household model variables
With the values o f the parameters presented in section 3-3-3-2, we get values for the variables o f 
the model: Equations 3.13, C.73, C.75 and C.76 give an expression of K as a function o f K o  and the 
exogenous parameters. If we equalize this expression with equation C.66 (using C.75), we get values 
for K and K o  (system of two equations with two unknowns). It is then straightforward to get the values 
o f all the other endogenous variables.
Hence we have:
K 0 -  15.577 4* 3.092 3ÿ (P (1 +  T)) _  l4 . 286 (N T  +  m l)
and:
K  =  3.633(p(l +  r ))4 ~  +14.077 -  14.286 (N T  +  m l)
From C.70:
7T =  . 5474p (1 +  r ) m .2
From 3.17:
From 3.11 andD.80:
From 3.12 and D.80:
From 3.13 andD.80:
From 3.14 and D.79:
From C.74, D.79 and D.80:
A =  .58824
Cc  ~
.425
C2 =  . 595
E  = .255
m
cy — .73073 
m*2p (I  +  r )
Tf =*
3 .1443m2 
( P ( l + T ))4 
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D.77
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D.80
D.81
D.82
D.83
D.84
D.85
From C.75, D.79 and D.80:
From C.68 and D.86:
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From C.69, D.79, D.80 and D.85:
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From C.65, D.79, D.80 and D.85:
K F = .2
Partial derivatives with respect to agricultural policy instruments are computed from these 
expressions of the variables, assuming that T  ~  X  =  ta — 1.
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APPENDIX E Values of the partial derivatives in the
household model (for T  =  L  =  w  —  1)
1 di /  dp(l+r)
PC t.4553 (p d + r) /
Q -0.425/p 3
CF -0.7307 /(p d + r))1
C, 0
K 14.532 (pd+r))3
Ko 12.369 (pd+r))3
Kc 0.2589 (pfl+r))3
Kr 0
Lo -0.7353 (pd+'O)3
Lc 0.7353 (pil+r))3
U 0
Tc 12.577 / <p( 1 +r))5
t f -12.577/(p d + r))3
Yc 0.6488 (pd+r))3 + 0.68 / (pd+r))2
y f -0.7307/(p il+ r))3
n 0.5474
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APPENDIX F Resolution of the general equilibrium model
From 3.37 and 3.46 in steady state:
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L f
We now replace the parameters by their numerical values, otherwise the expression o f the variables 
becomes very heavy.
F.100 becomes:
L c  -  ■ 15372T((1 +  t) p )4 0 -  .71429h F F.101
From 3.30,3.31, F.93, F.94 and F.95:
Lc  =  4.0 —. 96097k — 3 .571ALp F.102
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From F. 109 and F. 110:
nx  i
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With this expression o f k, we get all the endogenous variables.
When nx\ = 0 ,  equation F. 114 gives a relationship between T and p that will allow us to fix T for 
b, p and r  given by the policy. More precisely, p and T are chosen such that the model reproduces the 
stylized facts of the economy, such as the proportion of each production in GDP, and the proportion o f  
labor in each sector. The chosen value o f T  will remain the same throughout the experiments, while the 
value of the policy variables p and r  will change. We fix T from a situation where p =  1, r  =  —0.3, 
n x i = 0 .  It gives T=7.7593 (for b set to 0.5).
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APPENDIX G Change in endogenous variables in the general
equilibrium model
%  change I s* scenario 2nd scenario
Y r 140 146
y f . - 5 - 2 0
Ys - 5 0 - 4 5
K r 211 219
K r 0 0
K , - 5 0 - 4 5
Lr 211 219
l f 0 0
U  _ - 5 0 -4 5
Tr 9 12
T p - 4 6 -5 3
q 185 185
pi 30 30
x t 180 180
M? 261 182
N T - 1 0 0 - 120
cF -2 3 -2 3
- C r -2 3 0
c \ 53 33
C NA, -2 3 0
C NA, 53 33
PCa(L a) 30.5 32.7
PC na( U a) -41 -39
PC ,(L ,))/ L, -21.3 -19.6
P C 4 U / L , -27.4 -26
PC 20 22.3
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Conclusion
This thesis has presented the recent evolution of agricultural sectors and agricultural policies in 
some developed and developing countries. The models developed were applied to the European Union 
and to a very poor representative developing country, where the share of agriculture in the economy is 
very large. In both kinds of countries, some common salient features can be distinguished: Regarding the 
evolution o f the agricultural sector, it consists in the development o f off-farm labor by farmers, meaning 
that current fanners often have other activities than fanning, which does no longer represent a full time 
job. These activities consist in other sectors’ activities or in form activities but in farms larger than the 
ones they own (mainly in developing countries). Regarding agricultural policies’ evolution, it consists in 
an evolution towards less public intervention: In developed countries, it means that agricultural support 
has to be diminished, while in developing countries agricultural taxation has to be reduced.
The evolution of the farm sector leads to a necessary reconsideration of the definition o f a farmer, 
since, previously, he was usually defined as someone spending all his work time in the agricultural 
sector. This change in the definition o f the agents gives a new perspective on the existing results on the 
welfare consequences of agricultural liberalization. It also leads to new results about the agricultural 
instruments most adapted to different economic, political and social objectives. Indeed, in this new 
perspective, agricultural instruments have to change not only in order to allow more liberalized policies, 
but also in order to take into account the changes in the structure of the farm sector.
The model developed to represent the European Union agricultural policy shows that fanners’s
welfare decreases dramatically when agricultural support measures are eliminated. However,
considering the very small share o f farmers in the society, social welfare increases, and it is hence
possible to compensate the farmers for their losses. It has been shown that direct payments are the best
instrument to target specific farmers. For instance, direct payments can be used to remunerate some
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environmental activities o f the fanners which are not remunerated through the market Symmetrically, 
in the developing country studied, farmers benefit from the decrease in the agricultural sector taxation. 
Since they represent the main part o f the population, global welfare increases, and, again, it is possible 
to compensate non-farmers for their losses (although compensation schemes are very difficult to 
implement in developing countries). However, in the two kinds o f countries, the global positive results 
o f agricultural liberalization hide negative results for some categories of the population. For instance, in 
developing countries, agricultural liberalization is likely to hurt the most vulnerable part o f the society, 
since food buyers suffer from agricultural liberalization through food price rise. And, paradoxically, 
food buyers are not all urban dwellers, but they are also food crop producers and landless agricultural 
workers. Landless agricultural workers become even more numerous with agricultural liberalization. 
Indeed, farmers with low inputs endowments have difficulties to adapt to the liberalized environment 
that enhances commercial farming, where higher productivity is necessary. These farmers therefore 
have to abandon their own independent farm activities and to sell their labor in larger farms. However, 
in developing countries, agricultural liberalization would reduce the risk o f  too large migrations from 
the countryside towards the cities, since it enhances the commercial part o f the agricultural sector.
From these main findings of the thesis, some policy recommendations can be attempted. First of 
all, the evolution of the farm sector makes necessary to change the way to think about and to define a 
farmer, since he works less and less exclusively in a farm. In the European Union, the way o f looking 
at the fanners should be more linked to land ownership, which would better represent the stylized facts 
o f the sector. In developing countries, on the contrary, liberalization measures increase the number of 
landless agricultural workers, and hence makes necessary to look carefully at their welfare, even in 
countries where landless agricultural workers were traditionally few.
Changes in the agricultural sector also makes necessary to change the instruments o f the
agricultural policy. It is actually what is done in the European Union, with the reforms of the Common
Agricultural Policy. However, the way to compensate the farmers for the losses they suffer during
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agricultural liberalization may be different from the one implemented in the CAP reforms framework* 
The duration o f this compensation should be limited, excepted if  the compensation is seen as a way o f  
remunerating some services not accounted for by the market, such as environmental external effects. In  
this case, instead of deficiency payments (subsidies to production) often implemented in Europe, direct 
payments given to fanners completing an environmental role or according to social concerns should be 
preferred.
In developing countries, agricultural liberalization policy should be undertaken carefully, since 
the agricultural population represents the very large majority of the total population. Therefore, income 
distribution depends very strongly on agricultural policy. Moreover, since redistributive policies are 
difficult to implement in developing countries, any negative consequence of a liberalization policy 
on a share o f the population would be difficult to compensate for. For these reasons, liberalizing the 
agricultural sector through the elimination o f the production tax rather than the elimination o f the 
marketing boards permits to go on subsidizing some poor consumers hardly reached by any other 
policy. However, liberalization should be progressive, in order to allow the domestic economy to adapt 
smoothly to its insertion into world markets from which it was previously isolated.
The conclusions reached in this dissertation obviously depend on the structure of the models
developed to represent the agricultural situation. The models developed in this dissertation display
several limits, and can be improved by many ways. Each way would represent a possible extension o f the
analysis. For instance, the models could be improved by representing imperfect markets and by taking
uncertainty, risk and missing markets into consideration. Indeed, a stochastic environment would give
the opportunity to study price volatility in addition to price level considerations. However, deterministic
models have seemed sufficient to give the first hints on the studied situation. Making the models more
realistic and sophisticated would not necessarily serve significantly the first purpose of the dissertation,
which was to assess the distributive impact o f agricultural liberalization measures when new features of
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the sector are taken into account34. Moreover, by being veiy general, the models o f this dissertation can 
be extended to a large range o f countries and situations. Another direction in which the dissertation could 
be extended would be in studying the two kinds o f countries (developed and developing) simultaneously, 
in a two-country model, in order to study the interactions between them when their agricultural policies 
change. Finally, the model could be enriched by taking into account some environmental externalities o f 
the agricultural sector, which would have an impact on the utility of the agents.
All these extensions would give more richness to the conclusions reached. However, this 
dissertation only aimed at pointing out the importance of the changing definition of the farmers in 
agricultural policies assessment, and the first elements of response to this issue were presented here. 
The following steps o f  the analysis are left for future research.
34 Indeed, although uncertainty considerations are very important in agriculture (because o f  the specific features o f supply 
and demand), stochastic m odels are not the panacea. For instance, Panned and alii (2000) review all the limits o f  risk analyses in 
the farm sector: They argue that, "for the types o f  decision problems most commonly modelled by agricultural economists, the 
extra value o f representing risk aversion is commonly very little" (p.69). They add that it "is not that risk aversion does not affect 
the farmer’s optimal plan, but that the impact o f  the changes on farmer welfare is small" (p.72). They continue by arguing that 
’’the importance o f representing risk aversion depends very much on the objectives o f the study. Risk aversion will be relatively 
more important in studies with an objective o f  predicting behavioural responses to a change, rather than of assessing welfare 
impacts or making recommendations to fanners” (p.74). Finally, they remark that "risk and uncertainty may still be considered in 
any analysis by the use o f  sensitivity analysis to investigate discrete scenarios o f  interest” (p.75).
(Reference: Panned D.J., B. Malcolm and R.S. Kingwell, 2000, "Are we risking too much ? Perspectives on risk in farm 
modelling”, Agricultural Economics, vol.23, p.69-78).
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